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The implementation of label swapping packet-forwarding technology 
increases the vulnerability to insider attacks. These attacks refer to unauthorized 
access from within an enclave to the outside network. In this thesis we propose a 
protocol to counter this category of attacks. The proposed protocol provides a 
means for fast packet authentication. High speed is achieved by the use of a 
trailer, which allows packet filtering at Layer 2, and the use of cheap and fast 
message digest algorithms. To overcome the weaknesses of a 128-bit message 
digest algorithm, each key is designed to have a very short cryptoperiod. Such fast 
rekeying is implemeted by key caching (the host has a table of keys). Initial 
performance measurements indicated that it is possible to use our protocol while 
maintaining very high data throughput. Specifically, our protocol implements an 
authentication module, called Network Access Controller (NAC). The NAC's 
modular nature allows it to be easily integrated with a variety of routing 





The reader is cautioned that computer programs developed in this 
research may not have been exercised for all cases of interest. While every 
effort has been made, within the time available, to ensure that the programs 
are free of computational and logic errors, they cannot be considered 
validated. Any application of these programs without additional verification is 
at risk of the user. 
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This thesis explores how the implementation of "Tag Switching" - a technology 
described in Internet RFC 2105 (Rekhter, 1997) - for Internet Protocol (lP) over 
Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) networks can increase the risk of an insider-attack. 
We present a protocol that counters this kind of attacks using a security "gateway" 
termed Network Access Controller (NAC). We also present a prototype simulation of the 
protocol in C++ for demonstration purposes. Further, we evaluated the performance (in 
terms of overhead) of the protocol. 
A. BACKROUND 
1. Networking 
a. Packet forwarding and "Tag Switching" 
The explosive growth of the Internet has created the demand for higher 
bandwidth and, consequently, for faster and more effective routing and packet forwarding 
techniques. Specifically, today's routers are processor-based thus, computation takes 
place at them. In order to decide how to forward a packet they use the Network Layer 
(Layer-3 of the OSI model) information contained in a packet's header and in 
conjunction with a routing table. A good analogy of such routing in real life would be a 
company transporting goods (messages) by trucks (packets). Each truck has a final 
destination IP address and at each crossroad (router) its driver reports its destination (the 
packet header being parsed) and asks a traffic coordinator (routing process) for 
directions. The traffic coordinator has a table of destinations and the corresponding 
directions for leaving the crossroad (routing table). He looks up the table and directs the 
driver to the right road (routing decision). 
The routing table at a router must be updated periodically to reflect 
topological changes or road fluctuations in the network. Each packet's header has to be 
parsed by the routing process. All these functions are currently implemented by 
specialized software. In summary, Layer-3 processing is complex, computationally costly 
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(time consuming) and the equipment required is expensive. Nevertheless, it has been the 
choice because it is very flexible and very functional as shown by Internet's exponential 
growth. 
Switching, on the other hand, is faster and less complex than routing, and 
the equipment (switches) are cheaper. It has been reported that for the same throughput, 
routing costs 20 times as much as switching (Newman, 1998). Switches use the Data-
Link Layer (Layer-2 of the OSI model) infonnation contained in a packet's header in 
order to forward the packet to its destination according to fixed rules. This functionality 
is implemented, usually, in hardware. An analogy of switching with the real world can be 
found again using the transportation company paradigm. A racecar leaves the company's 
headquarters and finds the best way to the destination (signalling). The racecar carries a 
paintbrush that paints the road with a fluorescent color. The truck drivers now need not 
know their destination; they only have to follow the paint. The only problem with Layer-
2 switching is that it is not as flexible and functional as Network Layer routing because 
any change in the route would require repainting the entire road from the beginning. 
Recently a number of new technologies have emerged that combine the 
Layer-2 switching with the Layer-3 routing for perfonnance, flexibility and functionality. 
They include Cisco's Tag Switching (Rekhter, 1997), Ipsilon's IP switching (Newman, 
1998) and 3Com's Fast IP (Seaman, 1997). Although there is not yet a standard, all of 
these technologies follow the so-called label-swapping paradigm for packet forwarding. 
This paradigm can be described simply as follows: A label or "tag" (i.e., an integer) is 
assigned to a packet) according to the flow to which it belongs. Packet forwarding is 
based solely on this label. The implementation of Tag Switching and Fast IP is 
independent of the lower network layers3 (Layers 1 and 2 of the OSI model). Therefore, 
they are flexible and adaptable. 
) The label is carried by the packet as part of its header. 
2 A sequence of packets with common attributes e.g., those carrying data for a video stream or a multimedia file. 
3 Only IP switching is closely coupled with ATM. 
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h. Asynchronous Transfer Mode 
The Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) protocol is a connection-
oriented protocol for computer communication, analogous to the telephony. It is designed 
to carry data at extremely high speeds (e.g., 622Mb/s). ATM uses fixed size (53 byte) 
packets called cells (Figure 1), which travel in virtual channel connections (VCCs), 
established between senders and receivers. In ATM, the cells that travel in one VCC 
constitute ajlow. The setup and teardown of a VCC are performed by signalling 
functions. The term virtual is used because a single physical medium (e.g., fiber optic) 
can be utilized to accommodate the traffic of many Virtual Channels (VCs). Once a VCC 
has been established, the switching of the cells inside an ATM switch is done in 
hardware. 
The Virtual Channel Identifier (VCI), an integer stored in each cell's 
four-byte header is used by switches to forward cells to the right VCs. Each cell's 
incoming VCI will be translated into a new one (the outgoing VCI) inside each switch. 
Each switch maintains a table that maps the incoming VCls to entries containing two 
elements: a new VCI and the appropriate output port. These tables are updated during the 












GFC: Generic Flow Control 
VPI: Virtual Path Identifier 
VCI: Virtual Channel Identifier 
CLP: Cell Loss Priority 
48 bytes DATA PT: Payload Type 
HEC: Header Error Control 
Figure 1. A TM cell format 
1 A signalling function. Signalling functions are responsible for setting up, maintaining and tearing down a 
connection and use permanent or semi-permanent ves dedicated to signalling. 
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Another attractive feature of ATM is that the users can request quality of 
service (QoS) for a VCC. Four ATM service classes provide different levels ofQoS. They 
are: 
• Constant Bit Rate (CBR): guaranteed transmission rate for applications that 
need it, e.g., 12 Mb/s for a videoconferencing Vc. 
• Variable Bit Rate (VBR) (real-time and non-real-time versions): a standard 
transmission rate (SCR) is assigned to a connection. This rate can 
momentarily rise to the peak transmission rate (PCR) in order to 
accommodate the needs in bandwidth of bursty transmissions. Real time (RT) 
version is required when an application needs to maintain a timing 
relationship between two users e.g., in voice applications. Non-Real Time 
(NRT) can be used when information retrieval at a later time will not cause 
any problem e.g., store and forward video. 
• Available Bit Rate (ABR): low cell loss 1 but the available bit rate fluctuates, 
depending on the network resource availability. 
• Unspecified Bit Rate (UBR): these cells are the first ones lost when 
congestion occurs. 
Although A TM is being heavily promoted, especially by the 
telecommunications community, its deployment has been slow mainly because of the 
existence and success ofthe IP. It is clear today that the ATM technology will not totally 
replace IP. However, the advantages of ATM - high speed and QoS -led to the 
deVelopment of techniques that combine IP and ATM. These are the Classical IP over 
ATM described in RFC 1577 (Laubach, 1994) and the LAN emulation (LANE)(AF-
LANE 0084.000, 1997). 
I Cell loss can happen when congestion occurs, e.g., when cells arrive at a switch at higher rates than the ones that 
the switch can forward them, this results in buffer overflow and consequently in cell loss. 
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2. Network Security 
The Internet is often called "the network of networks". Interconnectivity at this 
scale has created the need to protect an organization's network against malicious or 
accidental behaviors. The same argument holds for a subnet connected to a corporate 
intranet and for a site connected to a subnet. In order to safeguard a network or a network 
segment, a security policy must be set for the network. After setting the policy, the 
administrator(s) must choose tools that help enforce the security policy. These tools 
include boundary controllers, encryption (and hashing) algorithms, access control and 
authentication mechanisms. 
A firewall isolates an internal network segment from the outside world and allows 
access only to authorized traffic (Figure 2). Additionally, it controls access from the 







Figure 2. A firewall protecting an enclave. After (Hare, 1996). 
Below are two examples from (Hare, 1996) that demonstrate this functionality. 
They are implemented in the freely available firewall program TCP Wrapper. 
• Example 1: the entry in theletclhosts.allow file: 
fingerd, telnetd: 144.19.74.1, 144.20 
allows host 144.19.74.1 and all hosts on class B network 144.20.0.0 to access 
telnet and finger services. 
• Example 2: the entry in the letclhosts.deny file: 
5 
Fingerd, telnetd : .hacker.org 
denies access to telnet and finger services to all hosts in the domain 
HACKER.ORG. 
Encryption algorithms can be used as parts of protocols that can support 
confidentiality, integrity, authentication, non-repudiation of infonnation travelling 
between computers. There are many of them. Two widely used ones (Schneier, 1996) are: 
e DES (Data Encryption Standard) is the most popular. It uses the same key for 
encryption and decryption (symmetric algorithm). The common key is secret. 
The algorithm transfonns data into an unmeaningful series of bits. If the key 
becomes available to an attacker then the algorithm is compromised (broken). 
e· RSA (named after its creators - Rivest, Shamir and Adleman) is the most 
popular public key algorithm. The only secret key is the private key, which is 
known only to its owner. The public key is available to others. Data encrypted 
by a user's private key can be decrypted only by the same user's public key 
and data encrypted by a user's public key can be decrypted only by the same 
user's private key. 
Message digest} algorithms can be used to provide message authentication and 
data integrity. The whole message is mapped by the keyed one-way hashing function to a 
(usually) small hash value or message digest or message authentication code (MAC). 
This value serves the role of the signature for the particular message. The most widely 
known message digest algorithms are the ones of the MD family (MD4 (Rivest, 1990), 
MD5 (Rivest, 1992)) written by Ron Rivest (RSA) and the Secure Hash Algorithm 
(SHA). The SHA is part of Digital Signature Standard (DSS)(NIST, 1994) which is a 
protocol used for creating digital signatures. 
1 Known also as keyed one-way hashfimctions. 
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Finally, the authentication and key-exchange mechanisms, usually implemented 
by centralized authentication servers, allow access to resources only to authorized users. 
Two popular authentication services are: 
thesis. 
• Kerberos which uses conventional encryption and 
• X509-based key exchange, which is part of the Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) 
protocol and uses public key encryption (RSA is recommended as its 
underlying public key encryption algorithm). 
A more detailed discussion around Network Security follows in Chapter II of this 
B. SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis examines the vulnerabilities introduced to a network by the 
implementation of Tag Switching. In particular we have focused on security problems 
related to unauthorized access from the internal network (enclave) to the outside world. 
We call them insider attacks. 
Specifically we propose a protocol that will guard against this category of attacks 
and we evaluate the performance of the protocol. Further, a prototype simulation of the 
protocol in C++ is presented. 
C. ORGANIZATION 
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II gives an overview of network 
security issues related to firewalls and message authentication. Chapter III discusses high 
speed networking issues, in particular IP over ATM and Tag Switching. Chapter IV 
presents insider attacks (the problem) and our p~otocol (the proposed solution), including 
our assumptions. Chapter V presents the performance evaluation of the protocol. Chapter 
VI presents the conclusions we reached and describes future work that could follow this 
thesis. 
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Note that in Chapters II and III, we focus on the aspects of network security and 
high-speed networking that are related to the thesis. Both chapters are presented for 
background infonnation. The simulation source code and the software engineering notes 
about the code are included as Appendixes. We have also included as an Appendix the 
measuring code that was used for the perfonnance evaluati~n of the protocol. 
D. MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS 
There are three major contributions of this thesis. 
• It examines the vulnerabilities of newly proposed packet forwarding 
technologies that use the label-swapping paradigm - in particular Tag 
Switching. 
• It proposes a flexible I solution (protocol) that can be implemented in a 
straightforward manner. 
• It provides an initial evaluation of how the implementation of the protocol 
affects the perfonnance of Tag Switching when it is used for IP over ATM. 
I Can be adapted to any label swapping technology. 
8 
II. NETWORK SECURITY 
A. SCREENING ROUTERS AND FIREW ALLS 
A fundamental measure for home security is locking the door. However, one must 
be able to examine each person that knocks on the door and allow himlher to enter when 
it is desired. The same action should take place at the perimeter of a network segment 
(site, enclave or intranet). In the network case, arriving packets are checked (and not 
persons). These packets may arrive from the rest of the network, intranet and finally from 
the Internet. Additionally we want to control the access from inside the enclave to the 
outside world. Such functionality is known as access control, and it is implemented by 
devices generally known asjirewalls. The use offrrewalls is a common practice today. 
A Discretionary Control Mechanism (DAC) may be in force as part of the 
security policy of an enclave. In the context of such a mechanism, the security officer of 
the enclave may decide to prohibit a user access to the outside world. For example, the 
ISSO may have granted Bob access privilege to the outside world, but has not done so 
with Alice. In this case, the packets that Alice is sending must be denied access to the 
external network. 
A definition of ajirewall is "a collection of components that are placed between 
two networks that create controlled isolation" (Cheswick, 1994). It may be inappropriate 
to use the termjirewall for a variety of products and architectures. Nonetheless, it is now 
a general term in the literature. "Firewall" also has become a synonym for Internet 
Firewall, because it has been common for firewalls to be used as isolating devices 
between corporate or other types of networks and the Internet. In fact, frrewalls can exist 
between any two networks. 
The existence of a firewall increases the security of a network because by using a 
firewall one can enforce aspects of the network's security policy. When and how access 
to a resource (host, network or service) is allowed depends, and directly reflects, this 
security policy. Detailed information on network security policy can be found in chapter 
3 of (Hare, 1996). We must emphasize here that firewalls control the access to resources 
9 
in both directions: from the outside world into the network and from the network to the 
outside world. 
The following three main techniques are used in firewalls 1: 
• Packet filtering occurs when the firewall decides to forward or to block a 
packet based on some rules. The packet header is parsed and according to the 
type of the protocol and/or the values in the fields of the packet header e.g., 
the source or destination address, the packet is allowed to proceed or not. The 
firewall therefore can control the type of network traffic and the type of 
services available in a network segment. The term screening routers or packet 
filter routers are used for the devices2 that perform this screening task. Since 
each set of fields in the packet header is added to the packet by a layer of the 
OS1 Reference Model, we can identify exactly at which level the filtering 
functions takes place. Usually screening routers perform their screening 
functions at the network (a.k.a. Layer 3) and the transport layers (a.k.a. Layer 
4) of the OS1 Reference Model. Sometimes, however, filtering can happen at 
the data link (a.k.a. Layer 2) or even at the physical (a.k.a. Layer 1) layers. 
(Hare, 1996) 
• Circuit gateways are used to establish, for authorized users, a channel of 
communication between two network segments (networks, subnets, sites). The 
main concern is who is using an application and not what information is 
passed by the network application. Circuit gateways are similar to packet 
filters. Additionally they use the services of an out-of-bound authentication 
scheme that provides the information needed for authenticating a user.(Atkins, 
1997) 
• Application proxies are used when it is important to control the content of the 
data to an application. An example of such a proxy is one used to limit FTP 
1 Details for all of the techniques can be found in (Atkins, 1997). 
2 They are commercial routers that are capable of screening packets. 
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users so that they can only get files from the Internet, but never push local 
files to the Internet. The problem with application proxies is that they are 
application specific and therefore, difficult to write and maintain. Application 
proxies can be combined together with circuit gateways in firewall products. 
(Atkins, 1997) 
We are interested in combining the packet filtering and circuit gateways 
techniques in our design of the NAC. 
'B. MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION FUNCTIONS 
Computer networks are vulnerable to a number of attacks. We describe some of 
these attacks in order to give a perspective of the potential threats to a ,network. Message 
authentication is one of the effective measures against a broad spectrum of network 
attacks. We describe three classes of message authentication in this section. 
1. Network Attacks 
Stallings describes the possible attacks in computer networks (Stallings, 1995): 
• Disclosure: the contents of a message become available to an unauthorized to 
know person or process 
• Traffic analysis: a pattern of traffic between the communicating entities is 
identified. Information such as frequency and duration of connections i , 
number and size of messages can be deduced. 
• Masquerade: an malicious source creates and inserts messages into the 
network. These messages may be purported to come from an authorized 
entity, they may be faulty acknowledgements of messages etc. 
• Content modification: the contents of a message are changed, deleted or 
modified. 
i In connection oriented communications such as ATM. 
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• Sequence modification: the sequence of messages is altered. New messages 
may be inserted, messages can be deleted or simply reordered. 
• Timing modification: Messages may be delayed or replayed. An individual 
message (e.g., datagram), an entire session or a sequence of messages 
belonging to a previous, valid session can be replayed or delayed. 
• Repudiation: a source denies that it ever sent a message or a destination denies 
that it ever received a message. 
2. Authentication Functions 
Message authentication can counter masquerade, content modification, sequence 
modific~tion and timing modification. Repudiation is specifically countered by digital 
signatures. (Stallings, 1995) 
Message authentication mechanisms consist of two parts: 
• Authentication/unction: produces an authenticator (a value that authenticates 
the message) known also as Message Authentication Code (MAC). 
• Authentication protocol: the sequence of actions that verifies the authenticity 
of the message. (Stallings, 1995) 
The first part of a message authentication mechanism, the authentication function, 
can be further classified in the following three classes: 
a. Message encryption 
The ciphertext of the whole message is used as its authenticator. There are 
two different ways to authenticate a message: using a conventional (symmetric) 
encryption method and using a public-key encryption method. 
When a conventional encryption scheme is going to be used, if a message 
M has to be exchanged between two parties S (source) and D (destination) and the shared 
secret key is K, then the following scenario takes place: 
• S encrypts Musing K and produces the encrypted message: EK(M). 
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• S sends E K (M) to D. 
• D decrypts E K (M) using K and gets message M: D K (E K (M)) = M. 
If the key is known only to S and D, then D can be confident that message 
M came from S. However, the degree of authentication is limited. The key K could have 
been compromised or the encrypted message could have been a replay. Additionally 
when D is an automated system, and not an intelligent person, and message M is a stream 
of bits, it is very difficult for D to judge for M if it is an acceptable stream of bits or not. 
A video or an audio stream falls into this category. Any alteration could not be detected 
by an automated system. The result of this weakness of automated systems in the 
previous example would be that D, falsely, may assume that any E K (M) has come from 
s. Therefore, additional formatting of the method and additional redundancy is needed 
for using it in automated systems. (Stallings, 1995) 
In a public-key encryption scheme if the message M is encrypted with the 
public key ofD, denoted KpuD, no authentication can be provided. The obvious reason is 
that anyone that knows KPuD (since it is public, and therefore, available to every one) 
could have send the message E KPuD (M) to D. Authentication can only be provided when 
the sender S uses his private key, denoted KPrS, to encrypt M. The result is E KPrS (M) 
and it can be decrypted by anyone that has S's public key KPuS. This may affect the 
confidentiality of message M but D now can be certain that S is the sender of M. 
We can eliminate the disadvantages and get only the benefits from the two 
public-key encryption scenarios that we mentioned if we use - paying the additional cost 
in performance and complexity - the following, double public-key encryption, scenario: 
• S encrypts Musing KPrS and produces the encrypted message: 
EKPrs(M) . 
• S encrypts E KPrS (M) using KPuD and produces the encrypted message: E KPuD 
(E KPrS (M)). 
• S sends E KPuD(E KPrs(M)) to D. 
13 
• D decrypts E KPuD (E KPrS (M)) using KPrD and gets message E KPrS (M): D 
KPrD(E KPuD(E KPrs(M))) = E KPrS (M). (this step provides 
confidentiality). 
• D decrypts E KPrS (M) using KPuS and gets message M: D KPuS (E KPrS (M)) = 
M. (this step provides authentication). 
It is obvious that similar problems exist here, as with the shared key 
encryption scheme. Again, it is difficult for an automated D to reject a series of bits M as 
unmeaningful and replays can take place as well as it was possible in the conventional 
encryption scheme. Therefore, some refinement of the method is needed here, as well as 
in the conventional encryption scheme, in order to use it as an authentication scheme. 
h. Cryptographic checksum 
The sender S (source) and receiver D (destination) must share a secret key 
K (similarly to a conventional encryption scheme). S applies an encryption-like algorithm 
to the message M using the common key K. This algorithm produces a small, fixed 
length set of bits known as a cryptographic checksum or message authentication code 
(MAC). The MAC is then appended to the message M and both are sent to D. D 
recalculates the MAC (applying the same algorithm) for the received message, using its 
copy ofthe key K. The message is authenticated if the received MAC and the calculated 
MAC are the same. D can also be certain that M has not been modified (otherwise, the 
calculated MAC would not be the same with the MAC received). The obvious 
vulnerability of the method is when the secret key K has been compromised. 
The method does not provide confidentiality. In the case that the 
communicating parties need confidentiality, as well as authentication, the message should 
be encrypted (it is recommended that MAC is calculated for the plain text M and not after 
the encryption (Stallings, 1995)). 
The difference between the algorithm that is used for the MAC calculation 
and that of a conventional encryption function is that the former does not need to be 
reversible (it is a one-way encryption function) as it must be for decryption. This makes it 
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harder to break than encryption. Additionally the result is a compact representation of the 
message. (Stallings, 1995) 
(Davies, 1989) suggests the use of MAC in the following three cases: 
• Authenticating control messages in a network. Each control messages is 
broadcast with its MAC. A network node, playing the role of the 
authentication monitor, that has the secret key, authenticates the message or 
alerts all the recipients that the message is fake. 
• When a heavy load of incoming messages floods the receiver D. We cannot 
afford the resources to decrypt all of them. An authentication scheme that 
performs selective MAC checking on a random basis can be used. 
• For executable programs, an attached MAC could be used for assuring their 
integrity. 
(Stallings, 1995) adds three more rationales to the above: 
• When secrecy is not required but it is still important for messages to be 
authenticated. An example is the Simple Network Management Protocol 
version 2 (SNMPv2). In SNMPv2, the functions of confidentiality and 
authentication are separated. The incoming messages may not need to be 
secret, nevertheless, they have to be authenticated, especially when they 
change parameters at the managed system. 
• Separation of confidentiality and authentication functions allows for flexibility 
in the architecture. The designer may choose in which layer of the OSI model 
to apply the one or the other. A possible decision could be to apply 
authentication (MAC) at the application layer (Layer 7) and confidentiality 
(using encryption) at the transport layer (Layer 4). 
• When we want to protect the integrity of the contents of a message after it is 
decrypted. A MAC for that message can ensure that its contents have not been 
fraudulently modified. 
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c. One-way Hash Functions 
This is a variation of the previous method. A public function, H, is used to 
map each message M, regardless of its length, into a hash value or hash code h, offixed 
length m 
h = H(M), where h is of length m 
The whole point of the one way hash function is to provide a "fingerprint" 
of M that is unique (Schneier, 1996). The hash code is a function of every bit of the 
message. This provides an error detection capability since a change in only one bit of the 
message would result in a change the hash value (Stallings, 1995). 
1979): 
The characteristics of hash functions that make them one-way are (Merkle, 
•. Given M, it is easy to compute H 
• Given H, it is hard to compute M such that H(M) = h. 
• Given M, it is hard to find another message, M', such that H(M) = H(M'). 
(collision resistance!) 
A keyed variation of one-way hash functions a.k.a. messages digest 
functions can be used for message authentication. The actual ideas for the usage of keyed 
hash function are old, some of the proposed methods2 append3 (Tsudik, 1992) (Galvin, 
1991) or prepend4 (Galvin, 1991) or even do both (envelope method), a secret key (or 
two) to the message before the one-way hash function is applied. The benefit of using 
message digest functions instead of the previous two methods of authentication, given the 
hypothesis that confidentiality is not required, is that they are less computationally 
intensive than encryption, therefore, they are faster. Additionally there are several other 
! Collision resistance is a very important property of hash-function however it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
discuss issues related to that (strong, weak, etc.). 
2 Appearing in SNMPv2. 
3 Secret Suffix Method. 
4 Secret Prefix Method. 
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reasons indicating that encryption should be avoided - even when it is available in 
hardware implementation - whenever possible. (Tsudik, 1992) points out them: 
• Encryption software is slow, even for a small amount of data. 
• Encryption hardware is not extremely expensive but the cost adds up as each 
node in the network must be equipped with this hardware. 
• The overhead to initialize encryption hardware for small blocks of data is very 
high, mainly because encryption hardware is usually optimized for large data 
blocks. 
• Encryption algorithms are subjected to u.s. export control. 
• Some of the algorithms are patented, like the RSA public-key algorithm, and 
there is an additional cost for licensing them. 
Two of the most popular - and fast - one-way hash functions are the MD4 
(Rivest, 1990) and its improvement, the MD5 (Rivest, 1992). Both were designed by Ron 
Rivest, and they produce a 128-bit message digest of the input message. Another famous 
algorithm is SHA (Secure Hash Function). It was introduced by NIS, along with NSA for 
use in DSS (Digital Signature Standard)(NIST, 1994). It produces a 160-bits but it is 
based on principles similar to the MD algorithms. According to (Schneier, 1996) there 
are no known cryptographic attacks against SHA and because it produces a 160-bit hash 
value it is more resistant to brute-force attacks than 128-bit hash functions. 
An interesting variation of keyed hash functions is proposed in (Preneel, 
1995). The authors first expose the vulnerabilities of previous proposals of keyed hash 
functions and then they propose to include a key at the beginning, at the end and in every 
iteration of the algorithm in order to strengthen it. The new algorithm is called MDx-
MAC and the authors claim for the proposed method that: 
• It maintains the benefits of keyed one-way hash function usage (minimum 
implementation effort - maximum confidence). 
• The performance would be close to that of a one-way hash function. 
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• The required resources (memory etc.) for its implementation would be similar 
to that of a one-way hash function. 
• It is generic (can be used with any algorithm with the same principles as 
MD4). 
C. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we discussed computer security issues that are of interest as a 
background for this thesis. We are interested in particular in two categories offirewalls: 
packetfilteringfirewalls and circuit gateways, and in message authentication using keyed 
hash functions. The next chapter discusses networking issues of interest. 
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III. HIGH SPEED NETWORKS 
A. IP OVER ATM 
ATM has been chosen by International Telecommunication Union (ITU-T 
Recommendation 1.121) as the basis for the Broadband Integrated Services Digital 
Network (B-ISDN). An Integrated Services network is one that can be used to carry all 
types of traffic: data, voice, video etc. "Broadband" means simply high link speed (up to 
Gigabits per second) 1. ATM networks are being installed in both research2and 
commercial environments3• 
The Internet Protocol (IP) is the foundation protocol for the most widely used 
packet-switched network, the Internet. The popularity oflP is ever growing with the 
growth of the Internet. 
It is becoming increasingly important to interconnect IP and ATM networks. The 
easiest way to do so is for IP to treat ATM as a link-level (Layer-2 of the OSI model) 
technology (like Ethernet or FDDI), ignoring the routing and quality-of-service aspects of 
ATM. This approach is called IP over ATM (Figure 3), and it is still an area of active 
research. Additionally there is not a universally accepted method for IP over ATM. 
(Keshav, 1997) 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine in depth the different proposals of 
implementing IP over ATM. However, we think it would be useful, as background, to 
briefly describe the following: 
• The method oflP encapsulation in ATM Adaptation Layer S(AALS), 
• Cell loss detection Classical IP over ATM (CIP), and 
1 The term comes from the cable television: baseband is a single signal used for video, the band of frequencies 
can be chosen from the base ofthe spectrum; when many of these signals are modulated and fed into a cable a broad 
band offrequencies are used for all the channels(Kercheval, 1998) 
2 University of Southern California - Advanced Biotechnical Consortium (USC-ABC). 
3 Texaco, McDonalds, Chrysler. 
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Figure 3. IP over ATM model. 
1. IP encapsulation in AAL5 
The ATM Adaptation Layer lies on top of the ATM layer Figure 4. AAL adds 
functionality to the ATM layer, making it more suitable for higher layer protocols or 
applications. AAL corresponds to the network layer (Layer-3) of the OSI model) (Figure 
4). Five different AAL versions were developed in order to accommodate the diversity of 
existing applications. AAL5 is the latest version and possibly, the only one that will be 
used by future ATM networks. AAL5 provides: 
• A mapping of the high-layer data into a cell-stream. 
• Cell loss detection. 
The higher-layer data are grouped into packets that may have a maximum size of 
64 Kbytes. These packets are called frames. The AAL5 functionality is achieved in three 
sublayers: 
• The Segmentation and Reassembly (SAR) sub layer distributes the higher-
layer data into cells at the sender and reassembles the data at the receiver. It 
lies directly on top of the ATM layer. 
) There are arguments that AAL is a datal ink layer (Layer-2) however, AAL is a network layer because it provides 
end-to-end connectivity (even though it does not provide addressing and routing) and it provides a view to the transport 
layer (Layer-4 of the OSI model) similar to that of a transport layer over IP (Keshav, 1997). 
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• The Service Specific Convergence Sublayer (SSCS) which lies below the 
higher,-layers. The SSCS is a "shim" layer that fits the upper layer protocols to 
the AAL. Different applications from higher-layers (e.g., IP, TCP, UDP) 
send/receive their Protocol Data Units (PDUs) (a.k.a. packets), which 
"converge" at SSCS. 
• The Common Part Convergence Sublayer (CPCS) is the middle layer of the 
AAL (between SAR and SSCS). The CPCS performs functions common to all 
protocols. 
Application / Management Plane / 




/ Control Plane / User Plane ' ~ Higher Layers Higher Layers ~ 
Network 
A TM Adaotation Layer 
;;;ii W 
Data Link " ATMLayer 
Physical Physical Layer y 
Figure 4. The OSI Model and the ATM Protocol Model. After (Kercheval, 1998) 
Below we discuss the two steps required for IP over ATM using the AAL5: 
• Encapsulation of IP datagrams in AAL5 frames: each IP datagram is put in the 
data field of an AAL5 frame. The IETF requires an additional encapsulation 
layer to add an 8-byte header to identify which protocol uses the frame. This 
layer is interposed between the IP layer and the AAL5 layer.(Keshav, 1997) 
• Translation of the IP destination address to anATM destination address. 
There are two major approaches: classical IP over ATM and LAN emulation. 
They are described in the next two subsections. 
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2. Classical IP over ATM 
IP (Ipv4) uses 4-byte addresses. ATM uses variable length Network Service 
Access Point (NSAP) addresses. A protocol similar to Address Resolution Protocol 
(ARPY could be used for translating an IP address to an ATM one. A problem is that 
ARP assumes that the LAN supports broadcast, whereas an ATM LAN does nof. A 
solution would be to have an ATM host to play the ARP server role. The ARP server 
translates IP addresses to A TM addresses using a table that contains addresses mappings 
(from IP to ATM and vice versa) for all the LAN members. When an ATM host wants to 
send an IP packet to another host in the same LAN, it queries to the ARP server sending 
its own A TM address and the IP address it wants resolved. The ARP replies with a 
message containing the address translation. (Keshav, 1997) 
The above scheme, when applied to very large ATM networks with thousands of 
IP/ATM hosts, would create a lot of overhead traffic every time a broadcast (which is 
common for Internet Protocols) was sent. The classical IP over ATM model partitions the 
larger ATM network into a set ofIP subnets called logicalIP subnets, or LISs, to reduce 
this traffic. A broadcast from a host can only reach the other hosts on the same LIS. This 
solution, however, introduces the following problem. A host has no way of knowing if 
there is a direct ATM path to a host in another LIS. Therefore, in the case where a host in 
another LIS has to be contacted, the sender must first set up a VC to an IP router. The 
router accepts the packet and uses IP routing to decide its destination. If the packet is 
destined to another LIS in the same ATM network, the router opens a VC to the 
destination (host or another router) and forwards the packet. If the packet destination is 
not reachable using ATM, the packet is forwarded using normal IP routing. (Keshav, 
1997) 
The problem with the previous approach is that even if a direct ATM path exists 
between two hosts, if the hosts belong to different LISs then they are obliged to go 
I ARP is used to translate IP addresses to datal ink Medium Access Control (MAC) addresses. 
2 An ATM LAN is a nonbroadcast multiple access (NBMA) LAN.(Keshav, 1997) 
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through a router every time they wish to establish contact with each other. Katz proposed 
the Next Hop Resolution Protocol in order to address this problem (Katz, 1996). A Next 
Hop Server (NHS) stores IP to ATM address translations for all the hosts (that have 
registered with it) in the ATM network. The registered hosts are considered part of a 
logical group called nonbroadcast multiple access (NEMA) subnetwork (similar to a LIS). 
If the IP address can be resolved by the NH server, the destination is contacted over an all 
ATM path, and IP routing is bypassed (this method of routing is called cut-through 
routing). Otherwise, the packet is forwarded to the local IP router for transmission (as it 
was done before). (Keshav, 1997) 
An additional problem that IP over ATM must address is the translation of 
multicast IP addresses (a.k.a. Class D addresses). The problem is caused by the fact that 
ATM is a nonbroadcast technology. A Class D address must be translated to a set of 
ATM addresses. The process must be dynamic to accommodate changes to the multicast 
group. The problem can be solved by having an ATM switch create point-to-multipoint 
connections1• Two such techniques have been developed: 
• The Class D address is associated with a multicast server that coordinates the 
multicast. The server maintains single connections with all the receivers 
(point-to-multipoint connection). The sender(s) send packets to the server. 
The server sends the packets to the receivers. 
• Each sender maintains a separate point-to-multipoint connection to every 
receiver in the group. The multicast connection is therefore achieved by a set 
of point-to-multipoint connections. 
In both techniques the translation of a Class D address to a set of A TM addresses 
is provided by a multicast address resolution server (MARS) (Armitage, 1995b). A 
MARS is an extension of an ARP server with the additional capability to maintain a 
point-to-multipoint connection - called cluster control VC - to every ATM destination in 
the LIS. The cluster control VC is used to update the mapping from a Class D address to 
1 A virtual circuit that sends cells from a single source to mUltiple destinations. 
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a set of ATM addresses as receivers join and leave the multicast group. More details can 
be found in (Armitage, 1995a). 
3. LAN Emulation (LANE) 
Continuing with our background information discussion, we will discuss LANE. 
LAN emulation is the ATM Forum's attempt to make ATM interoperate with the so-
called "legacy" networks that include Ethernet and Token Ring (even FDDI). The 
emulated LAN, however, must be one or the other. A router must be deployed if we want 
to communication between two emulated LANs. (Kercheval, 1998) 
As we have discussed in the previous section, IP over ATM allows IP traffic to be 
sent to any destination on the ATM LAN or elsewhere simply by translating IP addresses 
to ATM ~nes using an ARP server. Classical IP over A TM restricted the destination to be 
in the same LAN (either a host or a router). It is obvious that if this is the case, the 
address translation can be done under the data link layer (Layer-2 of the OSI model). The 
advantage of translating an address under the data link layer is that the address translation 
is not IP specific. In this case the address translation scheme can be used to carry 
protocols other than IP over ATM. (Keshav, 1997) 
Alternatively, address translation can be achieved by inserting an extra layer, 
called LAN emulation client (LEe), between the data link (MAC) layer and the AAL5 
(Truong, 1995). When the LEC layer receives a packet carrying a MAC address, it first 
checks to see if the MAC address is unicast or multicast. If it is multicast, the packet is 
sent to a broadcast server, which sends a copy of the packet to every host on the LAN. 
(LANE v2 (AF-LANE, 1997) supports enhanced multicast, a form of multicast where not 
all hosts must receive multicast traffic.) Ifit is unicast, the ARP cache is checked to see if 
it already has a translation from the MAC address to an existing VC. Ifno VC exists, the 
LEC sends an ARP message to a LAN emulation server (LES), requesting resolution of 
the address. (The LES stores the translation of every MAC address in the LAN.) The 
ARP responds to the LEC with an ATM address and the LEC uses it to set up a VC. (The 
LANE endpoint must be capable of AIM signalling (Keshav, 1997).) 
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Since LEC and LES operate at the data link layer, any network layer protocol can 
use LANE without modification. ATM, therefore, can replace Ethernet or Token Ring in 
a straightforward manner (Keshav, 1997). In LANE v2, LEes can request for a particular 
class of quality of service (QoSY when they set up the VC2• That was not possible in vI 
where all traffic was treated as belonging in the Unspecified Bit Rate (UBR) class. 
Detailed information about LANE can be found in (AP-LANE, 1997). 
B. TAG SWITCHING 
The following isa summary of (Rekhter, 1997), which contains an overview of 
Cisco Systems' Tag Switching architecture. Tag Switching is a novel approach to Layer-
3 (network layer) packet forwarding. The claimed features of the Tag Switching 
technology are the following: 
• The use of the simple label swapping forwarding paradigm improves the 
forwarding performance. 
• A tag3 can be associated with a wide range of forwarding granularities so the 
same forwarding paradigm can be used to support a variety of routing 
functions. For example, in one case a tag can be used for destination-based 
routing (the tag is associated with a point-to-point connection), while in 
another case a tag can be used for multicast (the tag is associated with a point-
to-multipoint connection). 
• The simplicity of the forwarding paradigm, the wide range of flow 
aggregation granularities and the fact that the forwarding paradigm remains 
the same enables a tag switching system to gracefully evolve to accommodate 
emerging requirements. 
I You can have Available Bit Rate (ABR). 
2 A signalling function. 
3 A tag is defining a flow. 
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Next, we describe the two main components of Tag Switching architecture: the 
forwarding component and the control component. 
1. Forwarding Component 
When a packet with a tag is received by a tag switch, the switch uses the tag as an 
index in its Tag Information Base (I'IB) (Figure 4). The TIB contains entries that consist 
of an incoming tag, and one or more sub-entries 1 of the form [outgoing tag, outgoing 
interface, outgoing link level information]. The switch looks in the TIB to find an entry 
that has an incoming tag equal to the tag carried in the packet. If the tag is found, for each 
sub-entry the switch replaces the tag in the packet with the outgoing tag, the link level 
information (e.g., MAC address) with the outgoing link level information and forwards 
the packet to the outgoing interface. The following are the important characteristics of the 
forwarding component: 
• The forwarding decision is based on the exact match algorithm using a fixed 
length, short tag as an index. Therefore the forwarding procedure is simple 
and allows high forwarding performance (more packets per second). 
Additionally the simplicity of the forwarding component allows for its 
implementation in hardware. 
• The forwarding decision is independent of the tag's granularity so the same 
forwarding paradigm can be used to support different routing functions. A 
good example demonstrating this is the way that the algorithm is used for 
unicast and multicast. In unicast, an entry in the TIB would only have a single 
[outgoing tag, outgoing interface, outgoing link level information] sub-entry. 
In multicast, an entry would have one or more sub-entries and the outgoing 
link information would include a multicast MAC address. 
1 In the case of multicast one incoming tag must be associated with many outgoing tags thus we have more than 
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Incoming Outgoing Outgoing Outgoing 
Tag Tag Interface MAC address 
tagli tag 1 port 1 MAC 1 
tag2i tag2 port2 MAC2 
tag3i tag3 port3 MAC3 
tag4 port4 MAC4 
tag4i tag5 port5 MAC5 
tag6 port6 MAC6 
Figure 5. Tag Information Base (TIB) format. 
• The forwarding paradigm is independent of the routing functionality therefore 
any new routing functions can be readily. 
• The tag-forwarding component is independent from the network layer (Layer-
3) and it can be used with various Layer-3 protocols. 
A decision has to be made by the designers of a tag-switching network regarding 
the tag encapsulation in a packet e.g., where to put the tag information. So far, the 
following possibilities have been proposed: 
• A small tag header may be inserted between the Layer-2 and the Layer-3 
headers. 
• Encapsulation in the Layer-2 header. 
• Encapsulation in the Layer-3 (network layer) header (e.g. using the Flow 
Label field in IPv6). 
The flexibility of tag encapSUlation allows the implementation of tag switching over a 
variety of different links, like point-to-point links, multi-access links, and ATM. 
one sub-entries. 
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2. Control Component 
In tag switching it is important to be able to identify Layer-3 routes by looking at 
a tag. This binding is essential. In different forwarding granularities a tag may support 
unicast (the tag identifies one route) or multicast (the tag identifies more than one routes). 
The control component is responsible for the creation of the tag-route bindings and for 
the distribution of the tag binding information among tag switches. The control 
component is modular with different modules supporting different routing functions. The 
benefit of this modular design is that when new routing functions emerge, tag switching 
will be able to support them by adding new modules. 
Further details of how the control component is supposed to support the routing 
functions of destination-based routing, hierarchy of routing knowledge, multicast and 
flexible routing can be found in (Rekhter, 1997). 
3. Tag Switching with ATM 
Since both the tag switching forwarding paradigm and ATM cell forwarding is 
based on label swapping, tag switching technology can readily be applied to ATM 
switches by implementing the control component of tag switching. 
The tag can be carried in the vel field of the cell. If two levels of tagging are 
needed, then the VPI field could be used as well! . 
The switch should be able to participate as a peer in network layer routing 
protocols in order to be able to get the necessary control information for tag bindings. 
Routing protocols (e.g., OSPF for interior routing, BGP for exterior routing) are used for 
exchanging information about the network topology - both interior and exterior. This 
information must be stored in the switch so that it is able to successfully perform the 
bindings between tags and routes. Additionally, the switch may need to allocate more 
than one tag for the same route. This is required to avoid packet interleaving when 
packets arrive from different upstream tag switches that are destined for the same next 
hop. 
! One level of tagging (the VCI field) is adequate for most applications 
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- - --------~~~~~~~~~~~-----------------------------
Therefore, the minimum requirements for an ATM switch to support tag 
switching are: capability to support network layer routing protocols and ability to 
implement the tag switching control component. An additional requirement may be 
support for some form of network layer forwarding. 
The benefits of implementing tag switching on ATM switches are: 
• It would greatly simplify the integration of ATMswitches and routers because 
an ATM switch would appear as another router to an adjacent router. This fact 
could provide a more scalable alternative to the overlay model. 
• It removes the necessity for A TM addressing, routing and signalling schemes 
since now the forwarding process is topology-driven and not flow based. 
• It maintains the ATM switch's ability to support traditional ATM. The tag 
switching control component and the ATM control plane (the corresponding 
ATM control component e.g., PNNP) would operate in a non-interactive 
manner. 
4. Summary 
The following characteristics of tag switching make it an interesting proposal: 
• It is not constrained by a particular network layer protocol - it is a 
multiprotocol solution. 
• The simplicity of the forwarding component facilitates high performance 
forwarding. 
• The forwarding component can be implemented in high performance 
hardware such as ATM switches. 
1 PublicfPrivate Network to Network Interface is the collection of signalling functions for setting up, maintaining, 
and closing a connection. Another such collection is the User to Network Interface (UNI) that refers to the signalling 
functions between a single workstation and the network. 
2 To achieve this we need to configure and partition appropriately the switch's resources so that each technology 
(tag switching and ATM) has enough resources available (like VPINCI space etc.). 
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• Tag switches have no impact on routers since they use the same routing 
protocols. 
• The control component is flexible and may support a variety of forwarding 
functions (e.g., destination-based routing, multicast etc.). 
• A tag can be associated with a wide range of forwarding granularities, which 
in turn allows for scalability and functionally rich routing. 
• The combination of a wide range of forwarding granularities and the ability to 
evolve the control component independently of the forwarding component 
make tag switching a technology that enables graceful introduction of new 
routing functionality. This is very important in a rapidly evolving computer 
networking environment. 
D. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we discussed computer networking issues that are of interest as a 
background for this thesis. We are interesting in particular in high-speed networks and IP 
over ATM technologies. We also discussed a novel routing technology, Tag Switching 
(Rekhter, 1997). In the next chapter, we will examine the problems that this technology 
introduces and we will present our protocol to address those problems. 
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IV. THE PROTOCOL 
In this chapter, we examine the vulnerabilities introduced by the implementation 
of the forwarding component of tag switching. In particular, we describe how the security 
policy of an enclave can be violated by unauthorized access from inside the enclave to 
the outside world. We further propose a security protocol. The protocol can be applied as 
a module of the control component in a Network Access Controller (NAC) to minimize 
these vulnerabilities. 
A. INSIDER ATTACKS 
Tag switching - and more specifically the label swapping forwarding paradigm-
introduc~s security vulnerabilities that have not been fully examined. For example 
(Rekhter, 1997) does not discuss any security issues. 
In this section, we will try to identify a category of vulnerabilities related to the 
unauthorized use of network resources by an insider. We will examine how an enclave 
insider (with physical access to systems in the enclave), who has no authorization to send 
traffic outside the enclave, can exploit the label swapping forwarding paradigm to violate 
the access restriction imposed upon himlher. This, in turn, will violate the security policy 
of the enclave. 
We focus attention on the forwarding component of tag switching. We do not try 
to examine the control component because it may differ greatly from implementation to 
implementation and it may evolve through time. On the other hand, the forwarding 
component - label swapping - is advertised to be a constant aspect of tag switching. 
Therefore, we are interested in making the forwarding component more secure. 
In this context, we examine which of the attacks described in Chapter II, Section 
B, can be performed by an insider. We describe the principles on which possible attacks 
could be based rather than the exact techniques that can be used by an attacker. We 
believe that several case studies would be required to describe the latter, and they are 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Additionally, since it is virtually impossible to 
31 
exhaustively examine all the techniques that a resourceful attacker can come up with, we 
have decided to take a more generic approach. 
Before looking at the possible attacks, we list our assumptions for the enclave: 
• There are users in the enclave that do not have access privilege to the outside 
network and their packets are not allowed to leave the enclave. A situation 
like this may arise when the enclave enforces an access control mechanism as 
part of its security policy. The information security officer may decide to 
grant access privileges to a user and may decide to deny this privilege to 
another. For example, user Bob has been granted access privilege but user 
Alice has not. Therefore, Bob is authorized to send traffic out of the enclave 
but Alice is not authorized to do so and the packets that Alice is sending must 
be denied access to the external network. 
• A link encryption scheme is not used (however an end to end scheme may be 
used). Therefore, the header of a packet goes in the open (but the contents of 
the packet maybe encrypted). 
• The potential internal attacker has spoofing capabilities i.e., (s)he can read the 
header of any packet. 
By examining the traffic in the network, the attacker can see the tags used in the 
packets sent out of the enclave by authorized users. He or she then can take two possible 
initial actions to compromise the security policy of the enclave: 
• Steal and reuse a valid tag to send unauthorized traffic without notice. 
• Alter tags to cause packets to be forwarded to the wrong destination without 
being detected. 
Since the tag is the only routing information used by the forwarding component, a 
tag switch, upon receiving a packet with a known tag, would forward the packet without 
further checking l • 
I The tag switch looks up the Table Infonnation Base (TIB) to find the incoming tag. Since the tag is valid, an 
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The remaining difficulty an attacker has to overcome is to ensure that the 
outgoing packets are going to be received by an intended partner in the outside. This can 
be achieved (comparatively simply) if the partner uses a sniffer program that picks up 
packets that leave the enclave. We will not examine how the attackers orchestrate this 
final stage of the attack. Our focus is how the internal attacker can manage to send 
packets out of the enclave. By denying this capability, we do not allow the attack to 
proceed to the final stage. 
We consider the following three broad categories of insider attacks. We describe 
how each of them can be executed by an attacker when the label swapping forwarding 
paradigm is used in an enclave. 
• Disclosure: Alice can steal a tag from Bob and start sending packets outside 
the enclave. This constitutes a direct violation of the DAC policy of the 
enclave. Additionally, another user authorized to access the network, could 
copy packets from the traffic sent by Bob, replace the tag with a new valid 
tag, and then resend them anywhere he or she wishes. Only end-to-end 
encryption would prevent the actual disclosure of data in the latter easel. 
• Masquerade: An unauthorized user can use a stolen tag to insert packets to the 
network. Additionally, higher layer computer communications protocols 
would not detect when the attacker steals and reuses the entire IP header. This 
kind of attack is also known as cut-and-paste attacks. 
• Timing modification: An attacker can delay or replay packets - belonging to a 
legitimate user. For a replay of packets whose tags have expired in the 
switch's TIB, the attacker must steal a new, valid tag and use it for every 
packet intended to be replayed. The "faked" flow may not have to belong to 
the original source of the packets. In the case where the attacker needs to 
replay packets as a flow from a different host, then other parts of the header 
entry exists. It simply replaces the incoming tag with an outgoing tag and adds a data link header to the packet. Then 
the packet is forwarded to the interface(s) designated in the sub-entry(s) of the incoming tag entry in the TIB. 
I Covert channels are also a problem but they are beyond the context of this thesis. 
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have to be changed in order to "fool" the higher layers of the communications 
protocol. 
B. THE PROTOCOL 
1. Protocol Overview 
In order to counter the kind of attacks described in the previous section, we 
propose the implementation of a protocol that will authenticate every packet that arrives 
at the tag switch. In this way only authorized packets i.e., packets that come from users 
with external access privilege, will be forwarded to the outside network. We also want 
the pack~t authentication and filtering scheme not to significantly affect the high-speed 
element of tag switching. 
Our protocol requires authorized users to append a fixed-length trailer to every 
packet. This trailer will contain all the necessary information required for the 
authentication of the packet. The decision to use a trailer was motivated by the following 
two facts: 
• We wanted to avoid parsing the variable-length IP header, which is 
computationally expensive. 
• It is simple to extract a fixed number of bits from the end of a packet. 
Our protocol will allow a firewall-like device, called Network Access Controller 
(NAC), to control the access from an enclave network to the outside. The NAC will play 
the role of a security "gateway" to the network. The NAC can be implemented at the first 
tag switch reached by packets on their way out of the enclave or may be a dedicated host 
at the edge ofthe enclave. A model for the protocol is shown in Figure 5. The 
implementation of the NAC will not affect or alter the tag switching technology. It will 
only add an intermediate authentication stage before the forwarding component of the 




- Figure 6. System Model for the Network Access Controller (NAC). 
The protocol provides a session-based solution l . A session is a period of time that 
a user-host pair has access to the network through the NAC. A session terminates either 
when the host completes sending its traffic or when the NAC times-out the host, 
requesting reestablishment of the session. The time-out enhances security because it 
prevents an idle session from being hijacked. The reestablishment of a session does not 
necessarily mean interruption of the data transmission channel because session 
reestablishment can happen asynchronously, out-of-band. There will be, in the worst 
case, only a momentary decrease in throughput. A session may consist of several flows. 
F or example, data flows, voice flows, and video flows may coexist during a single 
session. 
The protocol uses the services of an Authentication Authority to authorize the 
access to the NAC (and subsequently access to the outside). The protocol also uses the 
services of a Key Distribution Authority that will provide a session key for each user 
session with the NAC. The Authentication Authority also provides a ticket to the user-
host initializing this session. The ticket is used by the NAC to verify that the access is 
I It has to be repeated when a session is established or reestablished. This will become clear in our later discussion 
of the various phases of the protocol. 
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legitimate. A detailed description of the verification process is presented in the next 
section. The NAC creates a key-table (an indexed table of keys) for the session. The table 
contains a sufficient number of keys for the entire duration of the session. A detailed 
description ofthe key-table is presented in the next section. A copy of the table is stored 
in the NAC and another copy is encrypted with the session key and then sent to the user-
host. Only the intended user-host has the session key required to decrypt the table. 
Before each packet leaves the host a fixed-length MAC for the packet is 
calculated and appended to the packet. Specifically, when the packet is formatted by the 
user-host, an appropriate key is chosen from the table (key-table). The key index of the 
selected key (index of the key in the key-table) denoted by ki is inserted into the second! 
word of the trailer (Figure 6). Then MAC is calculated using a one-way hash function on 
the composite message that consists of the original packet, the first two words of the 
trailer and the selected 32-bit key. We have made the MAC 128-bits long because we use 
MD-5 as the default one-way hash function, however, it is easy to change it to match the 
message digest size of other hash functions. Note that the key is used in the calculation of 
the MAC; however, it is not included in the packet that is sent. Only the original packet 
and the MAC trailer will be sent. The original packet payload can be encrypted before 
MAC computation if high degree of confidentiality is desired. The receiver will decrypt 
the payload after removing the trailer. 
When receiving the packet, the NAC strips the original packet from the trailer and 
reads the key index (the second word of the trailer) and the MAC (the last 4 words). The 
next step for the NAC is to check if this is an authorized packet. The NAC looks up the 
key-table using the key index to find a key2. The key should be the same as the key used 
by the user-host for the MAC calculation. The obtained key is appended to the received 
packet and the MAC is recalculated at the NAC. If the calculated MAC is the same as the 
one received in the trailer then NAC knows the packet is authorized and will forward it. 
! The first word is not used currently by the protocol but it is reserved for future use (version information etc.). 
2 If no key is found the packet will be chopped. 
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Otherwise the packet is unauthorized and the NAC rejects it. The packet is also rejected if 
the key is not found in the key-table. 
2. List of assumptions 
Our design of the NAC protocol is based on the following assumptions: 
• The protocol is independent of the network layer technology that is going to 
be used. However, for simplicity we assume that Ipv6 is used. 
• The protocol is independent of the link layer technology that is going to be 
used. However, we assume that tag switching is going to be implemented over 
ATM. This will allow us to view the tag as an indicator to the VCI that a flow 
is using. This notion of a tag is easy to understand and is practical. 
• The key indexes in one key-table cannot have duplicates so that each key 
index corresponds to one and only one key. Therefore, we have a "limitation" 
of a total of 232 key indexes or a total of 232 keys in one table. While the large 
size appears to be overkill, the 32 bit-field allows for optimized indexing 
schemes. Following the VPINCI paradigm of ATM, we could use the first 16 
bits to identify the flows or hosts (host ids) and the rest of them to identify the 
keys used for MAC calculation. We will not examine this optimized version, 
instead we will focus on the basic indexing scheme where all 32 bits are used 
as key indexes 1 • 
• An Authentication Server is available in the enclave. Any authentication 
server can be used for our protocol. We currently assume that the enclave uses 
the services of Kerber os 5. Kerberos 5 is very popular and already in use in 
many sites and will be included in Microsoft Windows NTv.5. 
• A Key Distribution server is available within the enclave. We choose 
Kerberos 5 to play this role as well for the same reasons. Additionally, 
1 This scheme is very simple, however, we must keep in mind that it may create a very big aggregate key-table in 
the NAC (depending on the number of hosts with active flows in the enclave). 
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Kerberos 5 allows a choice of encryption algorithms (e.g., a client may ask for 
triple DES, or IDEA and Kerberos 5 will supply the corresponding session 
key). 
• As we mentioned in the previous section the NAC may be the first tag switch 
or a firewall-like host playing the role of the security gatewayl. In the latter 
case the NAC will simply filter and forward packets to the first tag switch. 
Without loss of generality we assume that the NAC is the first tag switch and 
that our protocol is going to be implemented on the NAC. 
• The security overhead must be kept to a minimum. For this reason, we do not 
use link encryption for the packets because it is computationally costly. 
Instead, we have chosen to use a cheap, keyed one-way hash function to 
calculate the MAC for each packet. (The motivation for using this method of 
authentication was described in Chapter II.) 
• The protocol can use any keyed one-way hash function to compute the MAC. 
We have selected keyed MD5 in order to demonstrate packet filtering can be 
done with a minimum security overhead. Our protocol overcomes the 
weakness of the MD5 algorithm - even the keyed version has been shown to 
be weak (Preneel, 1995) - with the use of short lived keys (e.g., the key has 
only a limited lifetime, denoted To, and it is "never" used again) and periodic 
key-table refreshing (we renew the key-table at regular intervals). 
• The key-table exchange can be conducted out-of-band and, therefore, we 
assume that it does not add any significant overhead to the in-band data 
transmission. 
• Periodically the NAC times-out a session, requesting a new authentication 
ticket from the user. This sequence of events can take place out-of-band. In 
1 The NAC does not necessarily introduce a single point offailure. In a distributed environment, we may have 
more than one NAC to implement our protocol. This will allow redundancy and load balancing in the enclave. The 
number ofNACs an enclave needs is a network design decision. 
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fact, the user may not even notice that at all, except in the case when he will 
be prompted to enter a password. 
• The user, after logging in at a host inside the enclave, is considered as a single 
entity, called the user-host pair. This is important because we are interested in 
being able to authenticate both the user and the machine. It is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to examine how this can be achieved. 
3. Protocol Phases 
We describe in detail five phases of our protocol. The description contains step-
by-step actions that take place when the protocol is applied. 
a. Initialization phase: 
• The user logs in at a host inside the enclave 
• The host requests authentication for the user-host pair from the 
Authentication Server (Kerberos 5) 
• The user requests a session key from the Key Distribution Authority (Kerberos 
5) in order to contact the Network Access Controller (NAC). In the request, 
the host specifies the conventional! encryption algorithm to be used (e.g., 
IDEA2). 
• The Authentication Server authenticates the user-host and the Key 
Distribution Authority prepares a session key. A reply is sent back to the user-
host pair that includes this session key and a ticket. The reply is encrypted 
with the algorithm of choice and with a secret key that is shared by the user 
and the Authentication Server. The ticket is a Kerberos ticket3 that contains 
! A public key algorithm can be used in the case that instead of Kerberos we chose to use X.509-based 
authentication (ChapterI.A.2). 
2 DES or triple-DES can also be used. 
3 Weare interested only for these key components of the key and not the exact form of it. More details for 
Kerberos can be found in RFC 151O(Kohl, 1993). 
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the session key, the identity of the client (host), the lifetime of the key and a 
timestamp (for validity checking). The ticket is encrypted with the NAC's 
secret key. The host is going to send it to the NAC when it requests to 
initialize a session. The NAC uses the ticket to verify that the user-host is 
authorized by the Kerberos to access the outside network. 
b. Connecting to the NAC 
• The NAC receives the ticket from the host that wants to send traffic (packets). 
• The NAC decrypts the ticket using its secret key (the one that is shared only 
with Kerberos) 
• The timestamp and the lifetime of the ticket are checked so that the NAC can 
decide if the ticket is valid or not. 
• Ifthe ticket is not valid the NAC disregards the request (and may audit the 
attempt for security purposes). 
• If the ticket is valid, the session key and the host id are extracted from the 
ticket by the NAC. 
c. Key-table preparation and exchange 
• NAC creates a key-table (we describe the format and functionality of the key-
table in the next section) that will be shared by the host. In order to simplify 
the protocol description, we will assume that the host requested activation of a 
single flow, therefore, the key-table is going to be used for only one flow. 
• The new key-table is stored into a database of keys that the NAC maintains 
for all hosts. 
• A copy of the key-table is encrypted with the session key and is sent back to 
the host. 
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• The host decrypts the key-table; now both the host and the NAC share the 
same secret key-table. 
d. Packet formatting at the host 
• Every time a host wants to send a packet to the outside, it chooses a key from 
the key table. The process of choosing a key and related rekeying issues will 
be examined and described in detail in the next section. The ki is stored in the 
key index field (second word) of the trailer. 
• The selected key is temporarily appended to the set (packet, ki) (first phase of 
the Secret Suffix Method). 
• MD5 is applied to the whole (packet, ki, key) and a 128 bit MAC is obtained 
(second phase of the Secret Suffix Method). 
• The created MAC is inserted into the last four words of the trailer (Figure 6). 
• The composite message (packet, trailer) is then sent to the NAC. 
e. Packet verification at the NAC: 
• The message (packet, trailer) arrives at the NAC. 
• The trailer is stripped from the packet, the ki is read, and the MAC is buffered. 
• NAC looks up the aggregate table in order to retrieve the key that corresponds 
to the key index read from the trailer. (If the key index is not found the packet 
is rejected.) 
• NAC repeats the Secret Suffix Method using the retrieved key and applying 
MD5 (repeating the same actions as the host) and creates a MAC. 
• NAC compares the created MAC with the received MAC. 
• If the MACs are not the same, the packet is rejected, otherwise, the packet is 
forwarded to the tag switching forwarding component. 
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It is clear from the above that our protocol is independent from tag switching, and 
therefore, can be applied to any label swapping forwarding architecture. Recall that we 
do not explore how routes are established in the tag switch because this is part of the 
control component functionality and beyond the scope of this thesis. 
4. Protocol Components 
In the following section, we describe the protocol components that were discussed 
in previous sections and we examine their functionality. 
a. Packet Trailer 
The packet trailer is a fixed length field appended to the end of each 
packet. The format of the trailer is shown in Figure 6. The length of the trailer is fixed, 
196 bits (24 bytes). The first 32 bits (first word) allow extensibility (e.g., to allow storage 
of version number or other information) and are not currently used by our protoco1. The 
second word (next 32 bits) is the ki. We see two straightforward ways for the use of the 
ki: 
• The ki is used only for indexing keys in the key-table. This would require the 
NAC to be able to aggregate all the key-tables that are in use by different 
hosts in the enclave. Every time a packet arrives at the NAC the whole pool of 
keys (the aggregate table) must be searched in order to find the corresponding 
key. It is obvious that in this case the key indexes must be unique. The NAC 
must keep track of which have been assigned and which have been 
deallocated (not used any more). The later increases the complexity of the 
NAC, which is something that we try to avoid. Additionally, if the number of 
hosts is large, then we can expect the aggregate table to be large. Searching it 
may incur large delay in the authentication process. 
• The ki also identifies the host that has created the packet. In this case the first 
part (e.g., first 16 bits) of the ki may play the role of a host identifier and the 
second part indexes the key in the table for that host. The NAC has to 
maintain a data structure, which will be a set of entries that will be indexed by 
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a host identifi er. Each entry will be a key-table. In this way, there is no need 
















Figure 7. The packet trailer. 
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affect the data throughput for the current session. However there is the synchronization 
problem for the activation of the new table. The host and the NAC have to work together 
in order to have a seamless transition from the old key-table to the new. A three-way 
handshake - similar to the one used for establishing a connection in TCP - between the 
host and the NAC can be performed for this purpose. 
5. Tag-key management 
We had to address how the host could select a new key. We refer to it as the 
rekeying problem. Our initial approach was to make the choice of a key random (from the 
key-table) for each packet. The motivation was that we wanted the lifetime of a key to be 
the same as the lifetime of a packet and therefore, the lifetime of a packet (comparatively 
short) would be the time available to an attacker to break the message digest algorithm. 
However, this would be true only if our key-table had at least as many entries as 
the number of packets that a host intends to send. Additionally, a mechanism would be 
needed to prevent the reuse of a key. In reality, since a key-table has limited length, then 
it would be impractical not to reuse keys. Key reuse increases the vulnerability to an 
attack. 
Given the above premise (that we have to reuse keys more than once), we 
examined how long a key is exposed to an attacker with random key selections. In our 
analysis, we assumed the following: 
• The lifetime of the key-table denoted T, is the same as the lifetime of the flow 
(e.g., the table remains the same throughout the transmission). 
• The number of entries in the key-table is n. 
• The flow for the current session consists of k packets. 
It is obvious that if we use random key selections we allow the whole period Tto 
the attacker to break the message digest algorithm. This happens because if a key is 
selected randomly a new packet may carry any of the key indexes (and subsequently any 
key) available in the table. Therefore, in this case the time o/vulnerability is T 
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Given that a key is selected for each packet, we deduced that statistically each ki 
is going to be used kin times. This fact led us to the following observation. If we use the 
same key, repeatedly, kin times (e.g., put the same ki in kin packets) and then discard it 
we end up using each key index only for Tin time instead ofT. We decide therefore to 
use a rekeying timer To = TIn. It is obvious that this approach shrinks the time window 
that the attacker has available to break the message digest algorithm from T to TI n. The 
selection of the next ki can be done sequentially! from the remaining unused key indexes 
in the table2• The only additional action is that every used key index must be marked as 
unavailable in the table or must be totally removed. 
Practically, the calculation of Tin may not be feasible, so the designer may choose 
to use a fixed value of To and whenever the key table is exhausted the key-table could be 
refreshed. The rekeying parameter To is important to our protocol as it widens or narrows 
the window of vulnerability to the message digest algorithm. 
I Since the key was produced by a random process, sequential selection of the next entry is acceptable. 
2 We can take advantage of this to optimize the lookup process of the key-table. The NAC could only look up the 
current and the next entries in the table and not the whole table for matching the key index. 
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V. PROTOCOL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
Our protocol introduces delays when it is applied to a network. The major delay is 
caused by the message digest algorithm (MD5) that we use on every packet. This step is 
required to create MACs and authenticate packets based on them. Another delay is 
incurred by the comparison of the recomputed MAC and the received one. Other delays 
such as the table lookup for key retrieval are very small 1 compared to the MAC 
calculation and the MAC comparison . 
. Any message digest algorithm can be used for MAC generation. We have selected 
keyed MD5 because MD5 is popular, fast and easy to implement. 
A. MD5 PERFORMANCE 
Measuring the performance of MD5 is not a new problem. (Bosselaers, 1996) 
contains some results and a proposal for improving MD5's performance. According to 
(Bosselaers, 1996) the speed ofMD5 (C code for x86 architectures) is 59.7 Mbits/sec on 
a 90 MHz Pentium. In order to improve the speed the authors rewrote the code in an 
assembly language and used the following optimizations2: 
• Keep the code and data in the Pentium's on-chip caches. 
• Organize the assembly code to take full advantage ofthe Pentium's two five-
stage pipelines. 
The above optimizations increased the throughput ofMD5 to 113.7 Mbits/sec. 
The authors however, mention that "these figures refer to the performance of the hash 
function's basic building block: the compression function". If one wants to calculate the 
performance for hashing a message of arbitrary length, he/she has to take into account an 
additional iteration due to the padding block. (Bosselaers, 1996) 
We perform our own measurements for two reasons: 
1 These operations can be optimized to minimize delay. We do not discuss the optimization details because they 
are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
2 More details on the optimizations can be found in (Bosselaers, 1996). 
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• To verify their results under a different environment without optimizations. 
• To understand how different versions ofMD5 are expected to perform. 
We measured the throughput of an unoptimized version ofMD5 implementation 
that has used the original MD5 code written in C by Ron Rivest (Rivest, 1992). We 
downloaded the source code from the Internet (ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/hash/mds/md5/). We 
compiled the code l using the Borland C++ 5.02 compiler. The measuring source code is 
included in Appendix E and the documentation of our code is included in Appendix D. 
We measured the performance on two machines: a 133 MHz Pentium with 256 Kbytes of 
Level 1 cache and 48 Mbytes of RAM and a 200 MHz Pentium with 256 Kbytes of Level 
1 cache and 48 Mbytes of RAM. During the experiment, we did not take any special 
measure~ to optimize the hardware and the software environment of the machines. The 
OS in the 133 Pentium was Microsoft Windows 95 and in the 200 Pentium was Windows 
NT 4.0. On both machines, the load was normal. 
We applied MD5 to a series of messages of different sizes. The message sizes 
ranged from 512 bytes to 64 Kbytes. The results for Pentium 133 are shown in Figure 7 
and the results for Pentium 200 appear in Figure 8. The measured throughput on the 
Pentium 133 machine was 35 Mbits/sec, regardless of the message size. On the Pentium 
200 machine, the throughput was 60 Mbits/sec. Therefore, our results are in agreement 
with the performance of MD5 measured in (Bosselaers, 1996). 
B. MAC COMPARISON 
Another cause of overhead is the comparison of the received MAC taken from the 
trailer and the MAC that is recalculated by the NAC. Measurements of the comparison 
process showed that the overhead was negligible when compared to the one incurred by 
MD5. We tried two different comparison methods. The first method compares the 128-bit 
1 We had to clean the in order to be able to compile it with Borland e++ 5.02. 
2 We had to write a driver and a set of utility functions to interface with the MD5 code. 
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MAC byte by byte. The second method breaks the 128-bit MAC in four 4-byte words and 
casts each of them to integers. This results in two groups of four integers. We then 
subtract each integer from its corresponding peer. If all the (four) subtractions turn out to 
be 0 then the MACs have to be the same. The results of the two methods are shown in 
Figure 9 and Figure 10. The documentation and the code are included in Appendixes F 
and G respectively. 
When we compared the two methods for performance, we noticed the following: 
• If the MACs are the same, the for-loop that compares the MACs byte-by-byte 
has to be executed in full. In this case, our measurements show that the byte-
by-byte method takes twice the time as the integer method. 
• If the MACs are different then the two methods take approximately the same 
time. 
Based on the results, we recommend the use of the integer method for MAC 
comparison. Note that the delay incurred by the MAC comparison is much smaller than 
the delay caused by the MD5 calculation; therefore, we can argue that both methods are 
acceptable. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis we examined how the implementation of Tag Switching or other 
label swapping, packet-forwarding, fast-routing technologies increase the vulnerability of 
an enclave to insider-attacks (Chapter IV). This category of attacks is related to 
unauthorized access from inside an enclave to the outside network. We proposed a 
protocol to counter this category of attacks. We emphasize that we do not provide 
protection against all kinds of attacks. 
The proposed protocol provides the means for fast packet authentication. The high 
speed is_achieved by the following: 
• Use of the trailer, which allows filtering at Layer 2. 
• Use of a cheap and fast message digest algorithm (keyed MD5). 
• We use key caching (the host has a table of keys) to allow fast rekeying. 
To overcome the weaknesses of the keyed MD5 algorithm we use a limited key 
lifetime To and periodic rekeying. Additionally, we use key caching, viz. we provide the 
host with a key-table, to allow fast rekeying l . The performance measurements indicated 
that it is possible to use our protocol in high-speed networks without unacceptable delays. 
The protocol implements a Network Access Controller (NAC). The NAC can be 
regarded as an authentication module. It can be an intermediate stage between the enclave 
hosts and the forwarding module of a gateway. If a packet does not make it through the 
NAC, it will not reach the forwarding module. This can be useful to counter denial of 
service attacks. The modular nature of the NAC increases its flexibility since it can be 
easily combined with a variety of routing technologies and other security devices while 
totally independent of them. The only requirements for the NAC implementation are an 
I Otherwise rekeying could incur unacceptable delays 
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Authentication Authority and a Key Distribution Authority, which are usually in place for 
a concerned network. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
Aformal verification of the protocol is required. A prototype implementation in a 
distributed environment could follow. For the latter, we recommend the following 
phases: 
• Modify the simulation code to use the services of a real Kerberos during the 
simulation. We recommend this to be done in a Windows NT environment. 
• Make the code portable to UNIX machines. In the code, we used C++ 
Standard Template Library (STL) containers like maps and vectors. When we 
were writing the code, Sun's libraries for C++ were not totally compatible 
with STL. However, this may change in the near future. There are 
commercially available STLs for Sun machines. 
• A Java implementation might be considered. Java has many attractive features 
that may benefit a prototype implementation of the protocoP. Java code is 
platform-independent, mobile and multi-thread enabled. 
• Choose a communication mechanism like sockets to pass information back 
and forth between the different entities in the network, e.g., the host and the 
NAC. In an initial phase, communication could be simulated over IP. Our 
code simulates the communication channel using files for information 
exchange. Specifically, each entity (object) that wants to send a key-table 
creates a file and saves the key-table in the file. The receiving entity opens the 
file to retrieve the key-table. 
I Slower perfonnance must be expected with Java. 
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• Create daemons that will implement the NAC and will provide its services 
whenever a request arrives. The nacclass of our code can be used with little 
modification for this purpose. 
• Simulate the Tag Switchingforwarding component in software. This can be 
done if we have an ATM Network Interface Card (NIC) in the machine that 
implements the NAC. The packet after being authorized by the NAC could be 
forwarded to a preexisting VC to another machine that could acknowledge its 
receipt. This will simulate how a tag switch would behave over an ATM link. 
Knowledge of the ATM Application Programming Interface (API) will be 
required so that the NIC could be programmed to forward traffic to the 
preexisting VC. 
Another issue that remains to be investigated is the trade-offs between various 
design parameters. Specifically, experiments can be conducted to evaluate the trade-offs 
between: 
• The lifetime of a key To and security. 
• The lifetime of a key To and the number of keys n. 
• The key length and the lifetime of a key To. 
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APPENDIX A. DESIGN SPECIFICATION OF SIMULATION PROTOTYPE 
1. Description 
The simulation program models our protocol. The program will simulate what 
was described in Chapter IV of this thesis. The platform for the software will be a 
Pentium-based PC running Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 OS. The language for the 
simulation is C++ and the Borland C++ 5.02 compiler was used. The object model of the 
prototype is shown in Appendix B. Future work on this prototype may consist of the 
phases that were mentioned in Chapter VI. 
The program will do the following: 
• First it will create a host object, a Kerberos object and a NAC object 
.- The host object will be registered with Kerberos. 
• The host object will request for a session key and a ticket from Kerberos. 
• Kerberos will create them (the ticket will be deposited in 
KEY_TICKET_FILE so the host object will be able to retrieve it). 
• The host object requests the start of a session with NAC. It sends the the name 
of the TICKET_FILE to the NAC. After the NAC verifies it it prepares a 
tableclass object (the key-table) and deposits it into the TABLE_FILE. 
• The host retrieves the table from the TABLE_FILE and starts instantiating 
Ip yacketclass objects. The packets are formatted in accordance with our 
protocol using a key from the tablE. The message digest for the set (packet, 
trailer) is calculated using MD5. The data part of the packet object is retrieved 
from the contents on the MESSAGE_FILE (this file must pre-exist for the 
simulation to run; its name must be included in the constants.h file). 
• The host requests authentication of each packet by the NAC, following the 
steps of the protocol. If the NAC authenticates the packet, the program 
displays that this packet was authenticated. 
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2. Layers 
The file constants. h contains most of the system parameters that are used in the 
simulation. The filenames that are included are required for passing information between 
objects. The message that is going to be included as the packet content must be in a file, 
the name of this file must be assigned to MESSAGE_FILE in the constants.h. Without 
this file the simulation will not run. 
The following classes were created (indentation indicates the hierarchy between 
the modules). We use the expressions host, Kerberos, NAC when we refer to the 
simulated modules. 
Hostclass: models the functionality of a host. 
Host_ticket_class: models the message that a host sends to NAC to 
establish a session. Prerequisite: the host has been authorized by 
Kerberos to do so and a valid ticket has been obtained. 
Nacclass: models the functionality of a NAC. 
Tableclass: models the functionality of a key-table. 
Host table vector: models the database of tables that NAC must maintain. 
- -
Host_table_class: models each entry of the previous database. 
Kerberosclass: models the functionality of a Kerberos module. 
Host_key_vector: models the database that Kerberos maintains for 
hosts and their keys. 
Host key class: models the entries of the previous database. Each 
entry contains the host_id and the secret key that the host 
shares with Kerberos. 
Key _ticket_class: models the reply of Kerberos to a host that requests 
to communicate with NAC. It contains a session key and a 
ticket (intended for NAC). 
ticketclass: models the ticket that Kerberos prepares. The ticket 
authorizes a host to further establish a session with NAC. 
Jp yacketclass: models the functionality of an IP packet. 
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We also used the following third party code: 
MD5: RSA Data Security, Inc. MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm (C code). We 
just cleaned up the code in order to compile and run it with Borland C++ 
5.02 compiler. 
Finally, we also wrote the following auxiliary code: 
Fileutils: provides services, needed by other modules, related to files and buffers. 
Hashutils: Services used for interfacing the MD5 package functionality. We 
modified a demo driver program for MD5. This driver was originally 
written by Andy Brown (1994, asb@cs.hott.ac.uk). The code was included 
in the MD5 code that we downloaded from the Internet. 
J. Modules 
3.1 Hostclass 
3.1.1 DESCRIPTION: the class simulates the functionality of a host inside an enclave 
that wants to get authorization for starting a session with NAC from a Kerberos 
server. The host needs to obtain a ticket and a session key, establish contact with 
NAC, obtain a key table and start sending ipyackets. The ipyacket will be 
formatted in accordance with the protocol we proposed in Chapter IV. We 
consider the user as part of the hostclass. 
3.1.2 DATA: 
host _id: an integer, that indicates the identity ofthe host. A real host id or an IP 
address could be used in more refined prototypes. 
Host_key: a string that is the secret key that a host shares with Kerberos. 
User _id: a string that identifies the user to Kerberos. The login name could be 
used. 
ki_key _table: a tableclass object that will be used for getting ki_key 
pairs for packet formatting. In more refined prototypes a container 
object (an array or a vector) could be used to contain more than 
one tableclass objects according to the needs (how many 
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flows need to be active simultaneously) of the host. 
Key_ticket Jile: the name of the file that contains the session key and the ticket 
returned from Kerberos. We chose to read them from a file 
because it is easy to understand and implement. In a more refined 
implementation we could receive this information from a communication 
channel established between the host and Kerberos (e.g., a socket buffer or 
something similar). The simulated ticket is exposed, however this kind of 
ticket exchange is used only for this simulation. 
Ticket Jile: the name of the file containing the ticket that the host will 
send to NAC. 
Session_key: this key is going to be used for the ki _key table exchange 
between the host and the NAC. In a more refined implementation the 




Input: kerberosclass & (a reference to a kerberos module) 
Output: the data member key _ ticket_file is defined. 
Return value: boolean 
Description: The host requests from Kerberos authentication by calling the 
kerberosclass' function that provides this service. Postcondition: the host 
has the name of the file that contains a session key and a ticket. If the 
authentication process fails then the return value is False. 
Send ticket 
Input: none 
Output: HOST_TICKET_FILE contains a host_ticket_class object. 
Return value: char* 
Description: The host creates a file containing the information that is 
necessary to NAC for host authentication. Postcondition: the 
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HOST_TICKET_FILE contains the host_id and a ticket (a 
host_ticket_class object). The name of this file is returned. 
Get table 
Input: const char* TABLE_FILE_NAME 
Output: the ki _key_table data member of the host is defmed. 
Return value: none 
Description: The host opens the TABLE_FILE_NAME file and gets the 
ki _key_table that was prepared by NAC. The host now has a copy of the 
key table available. 
Create_message 
Input: char* message_file 
Output: an ip-packetclass object is instantiated. 
Return value: ip -packetclass 
Description: creates and returns an ip-packetclass object. The 
ip -packetclass object is formatted by applying our protocol and using a 
ki_key pair chosen from the ki_key table. The MESSAGE_FILE name is 
included in the ipyacketclass object to simplify the process of reading the 
packet data. BE CAREFUL not to forget to create a message file and put 
its name in the constants.h file before starting the simulation. A new key is 
chosen every T _ZERO time. 
Get_session _key 
Input: none 
Output: the date members session_key and ticket_file are defined. 
Return value: none 
Description: extracts the session key and the name of TICKET_FILE from 
key _ ticket_class object that Kerberos created. 
Postcondition: the data members session_key and ticket_file get values. 
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3.2 Host ticket class 
3.2.1 DESCRIPTION: the class creates objects that contain the host_id and the name of 
the TICKET_FILE that contains the host's ticket. The objects are created by 
hosts. NAC uses them for host authorization. 
3.2.2 DATA: 
host id: an integer, that identifies the host. 
TicketJile: a string, that is the name of the TICKET_FILE. 
3.2.3 FUNCTIONS: 
Host id is 
Input: none 
Output: none 
Return value: int 
Description: The host_id data member is returned. 
Ticket Jile _is 
Input: none 
Output: none 
Return value: char* 
Description: The ticket_file data member is returned. 
3.3 Nacclass 
3.3.1 DESCRIPTION: the class simulates the functionality ofa Network Access 
Controller (NAC). NAC checks that a host (a user-host pair) requesting a session is 
authorized by Kerberos to do so. The NAC gets the ticket that Kerberos created 
when the host asked for authorization and extracts the ticket and the session key. 
NAC then creates a tableclass object (the ki_key table) for the session with the host. 
Stores the ki_key table in a database and sends a copy back to the host. In a more 
elaborate simulation, this copy must be encrypted with the session key. When the 
host starts sending ipyackets, the NAC must play its role in accordance with the 
protocol described in Chapter IV. Therefore, NAC "strips" the trailer from the 
ipyacketclass object, reads the ki and calculates the MAC for that ipyacket. If the 
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calculated MAC is the same with the one that was received in the packet trailer, then 
the packet is authenticated and can be forwarded. 
3.3.2 DATA: 
hosts_tables_db: the database of hosts and their tables. It is a host_table_vector 




Output: a tableclass object is instantiated and deposited in TABLE_FILE. 
Return value: char* 
Description: The name of the TICKET_FILE that contains the ticket of a 
host must be passed in as input. If the ticket is valid, NAC instantiates a 
tableclass ofbject and deposits it in the TABLE_FILE. The function 
returns the name of the TABLE_FILE. In the opposite case, the string 
"invalid_ticket" is returned. (Note: this can crash the program, if a 
function tries to open a file with name "invalid_ticket".) 
Authenticate yacket 
Input: ip -packetclass 
Output: none 
Return value: boolean 
Description: an ip-packetclass object is passed in by value (a local copy of 
the object is created). The ki is read from the trailer and the MAC is 
calculated. If the calculated MAC is the same with the MAC that is stored 
in the ip -packetclass object trailer the function returns True, otherwise 
False. 
3.4 Tableclass 
3.4.1 DESCRIPTION: the class simulates the functionality of key table.The table is 
created by the Network Access Contoller (NAC) and is sent to a host. We chose 
to use the Standard Template Library map container for the key-table data 
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structure. The map contains (ki, key) pairs. The "first" (the index) of each pair is 
the ki and the "second" (the value) is the key. We chose the key to be an integer 
value created by the "srand 0" function of C++, as seed we use the host id. This 
approach is suitable for demo only. In a more refined prototype, a more robust 
random number generator should be used. A key_generator could also be used. 
Additionally, keys could be chosen to be other than integers. The length of the 
class is defined by the constant NUM_PAIRS. The constant is defined in the 
constants.h file and we defined it to be 10. The kis are integers as well. We use 
integers in the range [1- NUM _PAIRS]. The kis could be chosen randomly 
without affecting the map implementation, but this is not necessary. 
3.4.2 DATA: 
ki_key_table: a map ofNUM_PAIRS ki_key pairs (pairs of integers). 
3.4.3 FUNCTIONS: 




Return value: int 
Description: the next ki in sequence in the key-table is chosen and 




Return value: int 
Description: a ki is passed in and the corresponding key is returned. 
Initialize_the _key yool 
Input: int 
Output: the tableclass is populated with NUM_PAIRS (ki, key) pairs. 
Return value: none 
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Description: a host_id is passed in. This is used as seed and the values of 
the keys are randomly generated by the srand function. Postcondition: the 
ki_key table for that host is initialized. 
Look_up _table Jor _key 
Input: int 
Output: none 
Return value: int 
Description: a ki is passed in and the fuction looks up the map for the 
corresponding key that is returned. (Note: the program will crash if a non-
existing tag is passed as an argument.) 
3.5 Host table vector 
3.5.1 DESCRIPTION: the class simulates the database of tables that is maintained by 
NAC. NAC uses this object to keep track of hosts and tables. We chose the 
Standard Template Library vector container to implement the database. The main 
reason was the flexibility of vectors (a detailed description follows). We can 
dynamically add more entries and remove old ones without caring for memory 
management. The vector elements are host_table_class objects (we explain their 
functionality in detail later). In this simulation, a host uses only one table. This 
can change easily in prototypes that are more refined, where a host can be 
associated with more than one table. 
3.5.2 DATA: 
Hosts_tables: the database, a vector of host_table_class objects. 
3.5.3 FUNCTIONS: 
Add host table 
- -
Input: a host_table_class object 
Output: the database gets a new tableclass object. 
Return value: none 
Description: a copy or the host_table_class object is inserted in the vector. 




Output: a tableclass object is removed from the database. 
Return value: none 
Description: a host_id is passed in and the corresponding entry in the 
vector (the host_table_class object) is removed. 




Return value: boolean 
Description: a hostjd is passed in and the (vector) database is searched to 
find if an entry exists for this host. If a host_table_class object is found 
with the same host_id the function returns True, otherwise False. 
Key Jar _host _ki 
Input: int, int 
Output: none 
Return value: int 
Description: a host_id and a ki are passed in. The function first finds in the 
database the corresponding to the host table, and then fetches the 
key indexed by ki. This key is returned.{Note: the program will 
crash if no entry exists in the database for the host_id or if a non-existing 
ki is passed as a second argument.) 
3.6 Host table class 
3.6.1 DESCRIPTION: the class objects contain a host_id and a pointer to a tableclass 
object. Objects ofthis class are used as entries in the host_class _vector database 
maintained by NAC. 
3.6.2 DATA: 
Host _id: an integer that identifies the host. 
Tableptr: a tableclass * pointing to the ki_key table that NAC created 
for the host. 
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3.6.3 FUNCTIONS: 
Host id is 
Input: non 
Output: none 
Return value: int 




Return value: tableclass * 
Description: returns a handle (pointer) to the tableclass object pointed by 
the tableptr data member. 
3.7 Kerberosclass 
3.7.1 DESCRIPTION: the class simulates the Kerberos server. It has two databases, 
one for users (a user vector) and one for hosts and keys (host_key vector). A user 
or a host can register with Kerberos (enter the database) or can request 
authentication to begin a session with NAC. In the latter case, the Kerberos will 
look if the host or the user exist in its databases. Iftheir user_id and the host_key 
entries are found, then a session key and a ticket are prepared. The session key in 
our case is stubbed to "sesskey". The ticket is a ticketclass object. The 
functionality oftickets has been simplified and we don't include timestamps (that 
real tickets have). 
3.7.2 DATA: 
Host_key _database: host_key _vector object, a database. 
User database: a vector of char* (user ids). 
3.7.3 FUNCTIONS: 
Register _host 
Input: int, char* 
Output: the host_key _database gets a new entry. 
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Return value: none 
Description: an int (host_id) and a char* (key) is passed in and an 
entry is created in the Kerberos database. Postcondition: the host is 
now registered in Kerberos. Additionally,Kerberos has a 
commonly known key with the host. 
Remove host 
Input: int 
Output: an entry from the host_key _vector is removed. 
Return value: none 
Description: a hostjd is passed in and the corresponding entry in the 
database is removed. 
Register _user 
Input: char* 
Output: the user database gets a new entry. 
Return value: none 
Description: a char* user jd is passed in and an entry is created in the 




Output: an entry is removed from the user database. 
Return value: none 
Description: a user_id is passed in and the corresponding entry in the 
database is removed. 
Request permission 
Input: char*, int 
Output: none 
Return value: boolean 
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Description: a user (char*) at a host (int) are passed in and the vector 
database is searched to find them. If entries for both exist, then return 
True, otherwise False. 
Send_key Jicket 
Input: int 
Output: the KEY_TICKET_FILE contains the session_key and the 
TICKET FILE name. 
Return value: const char* 
Description: the KEY_TICKET_FILE is created. The file contains the 
session key and the name of the TICKET_FILE. The function returns the 




Return value: char* 
Description: returns the string "sesskey". 
Create ticket 
Input: int, char* 
Output: a ticketclass object is instantiated. 
Return value: ticketclass 
Description: a ticketclass object is instantiated and returned 
3.8 Host key vector 
3.8.1 DESCRIPTION: the class simulates the database of hosts and their corresponding 
keys that Kerberos maintains. Kerberos uses this object to keep track of the hosts 
and their keys. We chose the Standard Template Library vector container to 
implement the database. The vector elements are host_key_class objects (a 
detailed description follows). This simulates the database of secret keys that a real 
Kerberos server maintains. 
3.8.2 DATA: 
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Hosts_keyes: the database, a vector of host_ key_class objects. 
3.8.3 FUNCTIONS: 
Add host 
Input: int, char* 
Output: a host_key _object is instantiated. The database host_key _vector 
gets a new entry. 
Return value: none 
Description: an int host_id and a char* (secret) key is passed in and the 
function creates a host_key_class object and adds it as an entry in the 
database. Postcondition: Kerberos has a secret key for this host. 
Remove_host _key 
Input: int 
Output: an entry is removed from the host_key_vector (the database) 
Return value: none 
Description: a hostjd is passed in and the corresponding entry in the 




Return value: boolean 
Description: a hostjd is passed in and the database is searched to find if 
an entry exists for this host (subsequently, if a secret key is shared by 
Kerberos and the host). If a hosty.ey _class object is found the function 
returns True, otherwise False. 
3.9 Host key class 
3.9.1 DESCRIPTION: the class objects contain an int host_id and a char* host_key. 
The host_key is supposed to be a secret key known only to the host and the 
Kerberos. Objects of this class are used as entries in the host_key_vector database 
maintained by Kerberos. 
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3.9.2 DATA: 
Host id: an integer that identifies the host. 
Host_key: a char* that is the secret key known to Kerberos and the 
host. 
3.9.3 FUNCTIONS: 
Host id is 
Input: none 
Output: none 
Return value: int 




Return value: char * 
Description: returns the data member host_key, a string 
3.1 0 Key ticket class 
3.10.1 DESCRIPTION: the class objects contain a session key and the name of the file 
that contains the ticket. Objects of this class are created by Kerberos !ll1d are sent 
to the host. 
3.10.2 DATA: 
Session key: a char* (the string "sesskey") 





Return value: int 
Description: returns the data member session_key, a string. 
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ticket Jile _is 
Input: none 
Output: none 
Return value: char * 
Description: returns the data member ticket_file, a string. 
3.11 Ticketclass 
3.11.1 DESCRIPTION: the class objects contain a session key and a hostJd (of the host 
that requested a session). Objects ofthis class are created by Kerberos and are 
sent to the host. The host in tum is going to send them to the NAC. (In a more 
refined prototype, real life Kerberos tickets can be used). 
3.11.2 DATA: 
Host id: an int 





Return value: int 
Description: returns the data member session_key, a string. 
Host id is 
Input: none 
Output: none 
Return value: int 
Description: returns the data member hostJd, an int. 
3.12 Ip packetclass 
3.12.1 DESCRIPTION: the class objects simulate ipyackets. Objects of this class are 
created by hostclass objects and are sent to the NAC for authentication. 
3.12.2 DATA: 
Ki : an int, the key_index of the key that was used for MAC calculation for this 
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packet. 
Host _id: an int that identifies the host. 
filename: a char*, the name of the MESSAGE_FILE that contains the data that we 
want to send with this packet. 
Mac: a unsigned char*, the message digest. 






Return value: unsigned char* 
Description: returns the data member mac, an unsighned char* . 
Input: . none 
Output: none 
Return value: int 





Return value: char* 
Description: returns the data member filename, a string. This file contains 
the data that we want to send with this packet. 
Input: none 
Output: none 
Return value: int 
Description: returns the data member host_id, an int. It is the id of the host 
that created this packet. 
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3.13 Fileutils 
3.13.1 DESCRIPTION: the file contains auxilliary functions for copying files to files 




Input: char* fromfile 
Output: char* tofile 
Return value: none 
Description: two filenames are passed in and the first file contents are 
copied and ovewrite the contents of the second file. 
Copy to b uffer 
Input: char* fromfile, char* tobuffer, int key Jndex, int key 
Output: none 
Return value: char* 
Description: a file name is passed in and its contents are dumped in the 
tobuffer string. Additionally the key_index and the key integers are 
appended to the string. This is protocol specific and a simulates the 
appending of a packet trailer. 
3.14 Hashutils 
3.14.1 DESCRIPTION: function that allow usage of the MD5 package are written here. 
The original code as it was mentioned before freely available in the Internet. The 
code is written in C and it was modified accordingly to accommodate the needs of 
our simulation. 






Return value: unsigned char* (the 16 byte digest) 
Description: a string, the name of a file that we want to calculate its 




Return value: unsigned char* 
Description: a string that we want to calculate its MD5 is passed in. The 
message digest is calculated and returned 
MD5Print 
Input: unsigned char* 
Output: none 
Return value: none 
Description: the message digest is passed in, the function prints it as series 




Return value: none 
Description: a string, that we want to calculate its MD5 is passed in. The 
message digest is calculated but it is not returned. This function is used 
only in the performance measurements ofMD5. 
compareDigest 
Input: unsigned char*, unsigned char* 
Output: none 
Return value: boolean 
Description: two message digests are passed in and are compared. The 
method of comparison here is byte by byte XORing. The function returns 
"true" if the message digests are the same. "False" otherwise. 
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Compare2Digest 
Input: unsigned char*, unsigned char* 
Output: none 
Return value: boolean 
Description: two message digests are passed in and are compared. The 
method of comparison here is the so called integer methode. We cast 
every four bytes of the 16 byte digest to integers and we subtract the 
corresponding ones. If all the results are 0 then the digests are the same. 
The function returns "true" if the message digests are the same. "False" 
otherwise. 
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APPENDIX B. THE OBJECT MODEL 


















APPENDIX C. SIMULATION SOURCE CODE 
~****************************************************************************** 
~****************************************************************************** 
II File: constants.h 
II Name: Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver. 5.02 
II Date: 17 Sep 1998 
II Description: Defmitions and consts used throughout the project 
II This file contains the necessary file names that the simulation uses as "communication 
II means. They have to exist for the simulation program to run. 
II Assumptions:none 
II 
II Warnings: none 
II 
~****************************************************************************** 
#ifndef _constants _ H_ 
#defme _constants _ H_ 
const char* TABLE]ILE = "keytable.dat"; 
const char* TICKET_FILE = "ticket.dat"; 
const char* KEY_TlCKET]ILE = "keytick.dat"; 
const char* MESSAGE_FILE = "message.dat"; 
const char* FILE_TO_HASH = "hmessage.dat"; 
const char* HOST_TICKET_FILE = "hosttick.dat"; 
Ilfor this implementation we choose a table of 10 pairs 
const int NUM] AIRS = 10; 
II T_ZERO is the cryptoperiod for the key here we choose 5 msecs 
const int T _ZERO = 5; 





II File: driver.cpp 
II Name: Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver. 5.02 
II Date: 17 Sep 1998 
II Description: This is the driver program that executes the simulation. 
II Assumptions:none 
II 















hostclass host( I, "hostkey", "ioannis"); 
nacclass nac; 
Ilprogrammer registers the host with kerberos(hardcoding) 
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kerberos.register _ host( 1, "hostkey"); 
kerberos.register _ user("ioannis"); 
lithe host requests authentication from kerberos 
host_authenticated = host.request_ authentication(kerberos); 
Ilhost "sends" ticket to nac 
char* ticketfile = host.send _ ticketO; 
Iinac prepares the key table 
char* tablefile = nac.prepare _table(ticketfile); 
lithe host gets the table 
host.get~ table(tablefile); 
lithe host sends the ip --'packets to nac 
lithe nac is called to authenticate each packet 
cout« "Press any key to start sending packets."«endl; 
for (int i=O ; i<10; i++){ 
cin.getO; 
ip --'packetcIass packet= host.create _ message("message.dat"); 
cout« "Press any key to send the next packet.\n"«endl; 
if (nac.authenticate --'packet(packet» { 
cout«"Packet " «(i+ 1) «" has been authenticated by NAC."«endl; 




cout«"NAC could not authenticate the packet."«endl; 




«"** Press any key to <exit> **\n" 















SIMULA nON PROGRAM FOR THE NAC PROTOCOL 
Author: Ioannis Kondoulis 
DISCLAIMER: this program is for demostration ONLY! 










< <"* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ** * * * * * * * * * * * * * ** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ** * * * * * * * ** * *"< <endl; 
cout«"PROGRAM LIMIT A nONS: The program will create and register only one \n" 
«" simulated user. The simulated user will create and send 1O\n" 
«" packets to the NAC. After its packet is authenticated it will \n" 
«" be displayed on the screen with a prompt to hit a key to \n" 
«" send the next packet. The program is not robust and its behaviour \n" 
«" is not guaranteed for sending more than these packets, to do so further \n" 





#ifndef _ fileutils _ H_ 
#defme _ fileutils _ H_ 
V***************************************************** ************************* 
V****************************************************************************** 
I I File: fileutils.h 
II Name: Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: MS Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver 5.0 
II Date: 19 September 1998 
II Description:the file contains a file copy function 
II 
II Assumptions: the max values do not exceed the consts declared here 
II 
II Warnings:be careful when you pass paths 'I' means ignore the next need to 
II use two "II" for the path to be valid 









Ilused for file names 
const short MAX_STRING_SIZE = 40; 
Ilfor each line in the file 
const short MAX_LINE _ SIZE=256; 
Ilifyou want to restrict the lines of the file ADD 
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Iino more of so many lines in a file 
Ilconst short MAX_NUM_LINES=512; 
lithe copy function expects two filenames 
void filecopy(char* fromfile, char* tofile); 
lithe copy to a buffer function expects a filename, a pointer to a string 
Iland the key that will be appended to the buffer contents 
char* copytobuffer(char* fromfile, char* tobuffer,int key_index, int key); 
#endif 




II File: fileutils.cpp 
II Name : Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: MS Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver 5.0 
II Date: 19 September 1998 
II Description:the file copy function 
II 
II Assumptions: the same as in fileutils.h file 
II 
II Warnings: When the driver is modified to create more than 10 packets the program breaks in the 
II cppytobuffer function in the marked BREAKPOINT. The driver works fme as it is now, 
II if you want to modify it you must increase the robustness of the code, especially memory 





lifunction: filecopy( char* fromfile, char* to file ) 
Ilreturn value: none 
Ilparameters: char* fromfile, char* tofile 
I/purpose: copies line by line the contents offromfile to tofile 
/ / The do while executed at least once so it can read the eof of an 
/ / empty file 
/ / ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
void filecopy( char* fromfile, char* tofile) 
char* strLinePtr; 
char* tempLinePtr; 
I/CASE IF YOU READ THE from file FILENAME FROM STD INPUT 
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fino need for now 
Ilchar* tempname; 
l/tempname = new char[MAX_STRING_SIZE]; 
Ilcin»tempname; 
Ilfromfile = new char[strlen(tempname)+ 1]; 
Ilstrcpy(fromfile,tempname ); 
IICASE IF YOU READ THE tofile FILENAME FROM STD INPUT 
fino need for now 
Ilcin»tempname; 
lito file = new char[strlen(tempname)+ 1]; 
I/strcpy(tofile,tempname); 
Ilfree the tempname memory 
/ldelete[Jtempname; 
Ilcopy the contents of fromfile to tofile 
//open the two files appropriately 
fstream in(fromfile, ios::in); 
fstream out(tofile, ios: :out); 
//allocate temporary memory for contents of each line (buffer) 
tempLinePtr = new char[MAX_LINE_SIZE]; 
do {I/read each line 
in.getline(tempLinePtr,MAX _LINE _ SIZE,'\n'); 
I/allocate exactly so many memory as needed tor this line 
strLinePtr = new char[strlen(tempLinePtr)+ 1]; 
/Icopy the buffer to this line 
strcpy(strLinePtr, tempLinePtr); 
Ilput the line in the tofile 
out< <strLinePtr< <endl; 
Ilcontinue until you reach the eof 
}while(! in.eof()); 





Ilfree the memory that was allocated to the buffer 
delete[] tempLinePtr; 
return; 
I I -----------------------------------------------------------------------______ _ 
lifunction: copytobuffer(char* fromfile, char* tobuffer) 
Ilretum value: char*, pointer to the buffer with the file contents 
Ilparameters: char* fromfile, char* tobuffer 
//purpose: copies line by line the contents of fromfile to tobuffer 
I I The do while executed at least once so it can read the eof of an 
I I empty file 
I I -----------.-------------------------------------------------------------------
II 




liTHE OBJECT sout DYNAMICALLY ALLOCATES MEMORY FOR BUFFERING 
ostrstream sout; 
Ilcopy the contents offromfile to tobuffer 
Ilopen the file appropriately 
fstream in(fromfile, ios::in); 
do{llread each line 
Iiallocate temporary memory for the contents of each line 
tempLinePtr = new char[MAX_LINE_SIZE]; 
in.getline(tempLinePtr,MAX _LINE _ SIZE,'\n'); 
Iiallocate exactly so many memory as needed tor this line 
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strLinePtr = new char[strlen(tempLinePtr)+ 1]; 
Ilcopy the buffer to this line 
strcpy(strLinePtr, tempLinePtr); 
Iideallocate memory 
delete [] tempLinePtr; 
if (in.eofO){ 
Iideallocate memory and break 
delete[] strLinePtr; 
break; 
II Breakpo,int (if you modify the driver to create more than 10 packets) 
Ilput the line in the ostrstream object 
sout« strLinePtr« endl; 
Iideallocate the memory because the object dynamically 
II allocates memory itself 
delete[] strLinePtr; 
Ilcontinue until you reach the eof 
} 
} while(! in.eof()); 
Ilclose the file stream when done with the copying 
in.closeO; 
sout< <key _index< <key< <ends; 
Ilpoint char* tobuffer to the contents of the ostrstream object 
char*tempbuf=sout.strO; 
tobuffer = new char [strlen(tempbuf)+ 1]; 







/* GLOBAL.H - RSAREF types and constants 
*/ 
/* PROTOTYPES should be set to one if and only if the compiler supports 
function argument prototyping. 
The following makes PROTOTYPES default to 0 if it has not already 




#defme PROTOTYPES 0 
#endif 
*/ 
/* POINTER defmes a generic pointer type * / 
typedefunsigned char *POINTER; 
/* UINT2 defmes a two byte word * / 
typedefunsigned short int UINT2; 
/* UINT4 defmes a four byte word */ 
#if defmedLalpha) 
typedefunsigned int UINT4; 
#else 
typedefunsigned long int UINT4; 
#endif 
/* PROTO_LIST is defmed depending on how PROTOTYPES is defmed above. 
If using PROTOTYPES, then PROTO_LIST returns the list, otherwise it 




#defrne PROTO _ LIST(list) list 
#else 





#ifudef _ hashutils _ H_ 
#defme _ hashutils _ H_ 
a****************************************************************************** 
a****************************************************************************** 
II File: hashutils.h 
II Author: Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver. S.02 
II Date: 17 Sep 1998 
II Description: This is an interface for the MDS functions that can be 
II that can be found in MDS.c file. The code here is not all mine. 
II I wrote the two comparison functions. The rest I modified from a 
II driver program that was written by Andy Brown and I downloaded 










#defme TEST_BLOCK_LEN 1000 
#defme TEST_BLOCK _COUNT 1000 
#defme MD S 
#defme NULL 0 
typedef int boolean; 
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#defme true 1 
#defme false 0 
I*prototypes* I 
unsigned char* MD5File (char* ); 
unsigned char* MD5String (char*); 
void MD5TestString (char*); 
void MD5Print (unsigned char*); 
boolean compareDigest (unsigned char*, unsigned char*); 





II File: hashutils.c 
II Author: loannis Kondoulis 
IIII Operating Enviroment: Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver. 5.02 
II Date: 17 Sep 1998 
II Description: This is an interface for the MD5 functions that can be 
II that can be found in MD5.c file. The code here is not all mine. 
II I wrote the two comparison functions. The rest I modified from a 
II driver program that was written by Andy Brown and I downloaded 




II Warnings: the 5 warnings that you will get are mainly due to the use 
II of C code that makes the compiler complain. 







unsigned char* MD5File (filename) 
char *filename; 
FILE *file; 
MD5 _ CTX context; 
int len; 
unsigned char buffer[1024], digest[16]; 
unsigned char* new_digest = malloc(sizeof(digest)); 
int i; 
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if «file = fopen (filename, "rb"» = NULL) 




while (len = fread (buffer, 1, 1024, file» 
MDSUpdate (&context, buffer, len); 
MDSFinal (digest, &context); 
fc10se (file); 
printf("MD%d (%s) = ", MD, filename); 
MDSPrint (digest); 
printf ("\n "); 
for (i=0; i<=16; i++) 
new_digest[i] = digest[i]; 
/*CAUTION: uncomment for debugging purposes only 
printf ("\n "); 
MDSPrint (new_digest); 




/* Digests the standard input and prints the result. 
*/ 
/* Prints a message digest in hexadecimal. 
*/ 
void MDSPrint (digest) 
unsigned char digest[ 16]; 
unsigned int i; 
for (i = 0; i < 16; itt) 
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printf ("%02x", digest[i]); 
}//end MD5Print 
boolean compareDigest (unsigned char* sl, unsigned char* s2) 
{ 
int i; 
boolean same = true; 
for (i = 0; i<16;i++){ 
if ((s 1 [iJ)",(s2[i])){ 






boolean compare2Digest (unsigned char* sl, unsigned char* s2) 
{ 
int i; 
boolean same = true; 
/*convert each Message Digest to four 4-byte integers 
CAUTION: THIS PART MAY NOT BE PORTABLE 
*/ 
/*ff all the differeces are equal to 0 then the digests are the same 
*/ 
for (i=O; i<16;){ 
if (sl [i]-s2[i]){ 






/* Digests a string and prints the result. 
*/ 
unsigned char* MD5String (string) 
char *string; 
MD5 _ CTX context; 
unsigned char digest[16]; 
unsigned int len = strlen (string); 
unsigned char* new_digest = malloc(sizeof(digest»; 
int i; 
MD5Init (&context); 
MD5Update (&context, string, len); 
MD5Finai (digest, &context); 
/*CAUTION: uncomment for debugging purposes only 
printf("MD%d (\"%s\") =", MD, string); 
MD5Print (digest); 
*/ 
for (i=0; i<=16; i++) 
new_digest[i] = digest[i]; 
/*CAUTION: uncomment for debugging purposes only 
printf ("\n "); 
MD5Print (new_digest); 




/* Digests a string, it is used only for testing the performance. 
*/ 
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void MD5TestString (string) 
char *string; 
MD5 _ CTX context; 
unsigned char digest[16]; 
unsigned int len = strlen (string); 
MD5Init (&context); 
MD5Update (&context, string, len); 
MD5Final (digest, &context); 
}//end MD5TestString 
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#ifndef _host_key _class _H_ 
#define _host_key _class _ H_ 
~****************************************************************************** 
~****************************************************************************** 
II File: host_key _ class.h 
II Name: Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: MS Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver 5.0 
II Date: 19 September 1998 
II Description:This is the class that contains the hosUd and the host_key 
II The objects are used by the kerberos as entries in a database. 
II They are created by kerberos whenever a host requests to 
II register with kerberos. 
II The registration function will be simulated for this demo. 
II The key exchange process is not of interest to us (we have to 
II assume that somehow the kerberos and the host are aware of the 
II host's key) therefore we will hardcode (we will assign) the key 
II for a particular host at a certain point during the simulation 
II and we are also inform the kerberos for the hosts key (the 
II programmer takes the place of secure key distributor) 
II The necessary functions to access the data are also 
II provided. 
II 
II Assumptions: the overloaded operators «, » are used 






class host_key _class { 
Ilfriend classes 
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friend class kerberosclass; 
friend class host_key _vector; 
Iloverioading i/o operators 
friend ostream& operator< « ostream& out, const host_key _ class& MY _ HK); 
friend istream& operator> >(istream& in, host_key _ class& my _ hk ); 
public: 
I I constructor 
host~ey _ classO; 
Ilanother constructor 
host_key _ class(int host, char* key); 
II destruc.tor 
-host_key _ classO; 
private: 
IIDATA 
Ilfor each host we assume there exists a key known to kerberos 
Iland to the host only 
int hosUd; 
char* host_key; 
Iiservice to kerberos 
int hosUd _ isO const {return hosUd;} 
char* key_isOconst {return host_key;} 
#endif 
Ilend host_key_class.h file 
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#ifndef _hashutils_H_ 
#defme _ hashutils _ H_ 
V***************************************************** ************************* 
V***************************************************** ************************* 
II File: hashutils.h 
II Author: Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver. S.02 
II Date: 17 Sep 1998 
II Description: This is an interface for the MDS functions that can be 
II that can be found in MDS.c file. The code here is not all mine. 
II 1 wrote the two comparison functions. The rest I modified from a 
II driver program that was written by Andy Brown and I downloaded 










#defme TEST_BLaCK_LEN 1000 
#defme TEST_BLaCK_COUNT 1000 
#defme MD S 
#defme NULL 0 
typedef int boolean; 
#defme true I 
#defme false 0 
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1* prototypes * I 
unsigned char* MD5File (char* ); 
unsigned char* MD5String (char*); 
void MD5TestString (char*); 
void MD5Print (unsigned char*); 
boolean compareDigest (unsigned char*, unsigned char*); 
boolean compare2Digest (unsigned char*, unsigned char*); 
#endif 
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#ifndef _host_key _vector _ H_ 
#define _ host_key _vector _ H_ 
V***************************************************** ************************* 
V****************************************************************************** 
II File: host_key _ vector.h 
II Name: Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: MS Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver 5.0 
II Date: 19 September 1998 
II Description:This is the database of host_ key_class objects. This class is 
II used by the kerberos module for keeping track of the hosts and 
II their keys. 
II The STL::vector data structure was chosen to contain 
II host_key _class objects. The vector dynamically extends to 
II accomodate each additional entry and automatically deallocates 
II memory when we remove an object. 
II The choice was made for simplicity for the demo purposes 
II In a more elaborate implementation a more sophisticated database 
II might be used. 
II The member functions are private so only the kerberos can get 
II their services. 
II Assumptions:for each host we assume there exists a key known to kerberos 









using namespace std; 
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- -~-~-~-~-----------------------------------------
Iia vector is used for the host_key _class object database 
typedef vector<host_ key_class> host_database; 
class host_key _vector { 
Ilfriend class 
friend class kerberosclass; 
Iloverloading i/o operators 
friend ostream& operator«(ostream& out, const host_key_vector& MY_HKV); 
Iidoes not make sense to input to a vector so no »is overloaded 
public: 
I Iconstructor 
host_key _ vectorO; 
I I destructor 




Ilmember functions for friends 
Iiservices to the kerberos module 
void add_host (int host, char* key); 
void remove_host(int host); 
bool is_hostJegistered (int host); 





II File: host_key _ vector.h 
II Name: Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
il Operating Enviroment: MS Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver 5.0 
II Date: 19 September 1998 
II Description: the same as in host_key _ vector.h 






#incJude "host_key _ vector.h" 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: default constructor 
Ilretum value: a host_key _vector 
Ilparameters: none 
Ilpurpose: creates a host_key _vector object that is empty 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
host_key _ vector::host_key _ vectorOO; 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: destructor 
Ilretum value: none 
Ilparameters: none 
Ilpurpose: destroys "this" host_key _vector object 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/I 
host_key _vector: :-host_ key _ vectorO 0; 
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I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: add _ host(int host,char* key) 
I/return value: none 
Ilparameters: int host, char* key 
Ilpurpose: This function is a service to the kerberos object. 
I I fIrst we create a host_ key-class object that will be the 
II new entry to the database (vector),then we use the STL::vector 




void host_key _vector: :add _ host(int host,char* key) 
{ 
Ilcreate new object 
host_key _class new _ host(host,key); 
hosts _ keys. push _ back(new _host); 
return; 
}llend add host(int host,char* key) 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: remove_host(int host) 
Ilreturn value: none 
Ilparameters: int host 
Ilpurpose: This function is a service to the kerberos object. 
II here only the host (hosUd) is required in order to fmd the 
II corresponding entry (host_key object) and remove it. A vector 
II iterator is used to traverse the vector object, fmd the entry and 
II remove it. Multiple entries are removed also. We use the STL::vector 
II member function "erase(iterator i)" that removes the object pointed 




void host_key _ vector::remove _ host(int host) 
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Iitraverse the vector 
for (host_database: :iterator i= hosts_keys. beginO; 
i!=hosts_keys.endO; i++){ 
Ilifyou fmd the host 
if (i->hosUdjsO == host) 
hosts _ keys.erase(i); 
return; 
}llend remove_host(int host) 
II ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: is_hostJegistered(int host) 
Ilretum value: boolean 
Ilparameters: int host 
Ilpurpose: This function is a service to the kerberos object. 
II here only the host (hosUd) is required in order to fmd if 
II a corresponding entry (host_key object) exists.A vector 
II iterator is used to traverse the vector object.Only one appearance is 
II enough to make the return value "true". True means that there exists 
II a host_key entry in the kerberos' database 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
bool host_key _ vector::is _ hostJegistered(int host) 
Illocal variable 
bool hostJegistered = false; 
Iitraverse the vector 
for (host_database::iterator i= hosts_keys.beginO; 
i!=hosts_keys.endO; i++) {//saferthan int i etc 
I/ifyou fmd the hosUd 
if (i->hosUd_isO == host) { 
hostJegistered = true; 






}llend is_hostJegistered(int host) 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: ostream& operator«(ostream& out, const host_key_vector& MY_HKV) 
Ilretum value:ostream& 
Ilparameters: ostream out,host_key_vector& MY_HKV 
Ilpurpose: a user defmed class has to defme how «behaves. 
II In our case if the host_key_vector object passed in by ref 
I I does not contain anything then we only inform the user that 
II the object is empty 
II otherwise we display all the hosUd and the host_key pairs 
II contained in the vector. 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
ostream& operator«(ostream& out, const host_key_vector& MY_HKV) 
{ 
if (MY _ HKV.hosts _ keys.sizeO<= 0 ) { 
lithe vector is empty 
out« n<host_key_database is empty>n«endl; 
} 
else{lltraverse the vector 
for (host_database: :iterator i = const_ cast<host_ key_class *> 
(MY _ HKV.hosts _ keys.begin()); 
i!=MY_HKV.hosts_keys.endO; i++){ 





}llend operator«(ostream& out, const host_key_vector& MY_HKV) 
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Ilend hostyey _ vector.cpp file 
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II File: hosUable _ class.h 
II Name: Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: MS Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland e++ for Windows, ver 5.0 
II Date: 19 September 1998 
II Description:This is the class that contains the hosUd and a pointer to the 
II tableclass object that was created by the nacclass object for 
II that host 
II The objects are used by the nacclass object (nac) as entries 
II in a database(vector) so that the nac can keep track of what 
II table that host has been allocated for further usage. 
II They are created by nacclass whenever a host requests a table 
II after the ticket ofthe host has been checked and has been found 
II correct. 
a The necessary functions to access the data are also 
I I provided. 
II 








friend class nacclass; 




host_table _ classO; 
Ilanother constructor 
explicit host_table_class(int hosUd, 
II TO DO CHECK THE CONSTNESS OF THE POINTER 
tableclass * const T ABLEPTR); 
I I destructor 




tableclass * tableptr; 
Ilmember functions for friends 
int hosUd_isOconst{retum hosUd;} 
tableclass* table_isOconst {return tableptr;} 





II File : host_table_class.cpp 
II Name: Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: MS Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland e++ for Windows, ver 5.0 
II Date: 19 September 1998 
II Description:same as in host_table_class.h 
II 





#include "host table_class.h" 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: default constructor 
Ilreturn value: a host_table_class object 
Ilparameters: none 
Ilpurpose: the initial values are entered in order to be able to check the 
II existance of a hosUd and a tableptr. The host_table_class object 
I I is initialized with hosUd:-1 and no tableptr(by default it is nulled). 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
host_table_class: :hosUable _ classO:hosUd( -1){} 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: another constructor 
Ilreturn value: a host_table_class object 
Ilparameters: int hosUd, tableclass* TABLEPTR 
Ilpurpose: the host_id and the TABLEPTR are entered to the created 
I I object. The object is going to be added to the host_table_vector database 




host_table _ class::host_table _ class(int hosUd, 
tableclass * const T ABLEPTR): 
hosUd(hosUd),tableptr(T ABLEPTR){ } 
/ I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: destructor 
Ilretum value: none 
Ilparameters: none 










II File: host_table_ vector.h 
II Name : Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: MS Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver 5.0 
II Date: 19 September 1998 
II Description:This is the database of host_table_class objects. This class is 
II used by the nac module for keeping track of the hosts and the 
II ~i_key tables they are assigned 
II The STL::vector data structure was chosen to contain 
II host_table_class objects. The vector dynamically extends to 
II accomodate each additional entry and automatically deallocates 
II memory when we remove an object. 
II The choice was made for simplicity for the demo purposes 
II In a more elaborate implementation a more sophisticated database 
II might be used. 
II The member functions are private so only the nac can get 
II their services. 












using namespace std; 
Iia vector is used for the host_table_class object database 
typedef vector<host_ table_class> 
host_table_database; 
class host_table_vector { 
Ilfriend class 
friend class nacclass; 
public: 
I I constructor 
host_table _ vectorO; 
I I destructor 
-host_table _ vectorO; 
Ilfor debugging purposes 
void print_ vectorO; 




Ilmember functions for friends 
Iiservices to the nac module 
void add_host_table(host_table_class host_table); 
void remove _ host_table(int host); 
bool is _ host_ authorized(int host); 
int keyJor_host_ki(int host, int ki); 
} ;llend host_key _vector class 
#endif 




II File: hosuable_vector.h 
II Name: Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: MS Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver 5.0 
II Date: 19 September 1998 
II Description:the same as in host_table_vector.h 






#include "host_table _ vector.h" 
I I -----------------------------------------------------------------------______ _ 
lifunction: default constructor 
Ilretum value: a host_table_vector 
Ilparameters: none 
Ilpurpose: creates a host_table_vector object that is empty 
I I --------------------------------------------------------------------------___ _ 
II 
host_table _ vector::host_table _ vectorOn 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: destructor 
Ilretum value: none 
Ilparameters: none 
Ilpurpose: destroys "this" host_table_vector object 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
host_table _ vector::-host_table _ vectorOn 
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I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: add _ host(host_table _class host_table) 
Ilretum value: none 
Ilparameters: host_table_class host_table 
Ilpurpose: This function is a service to the nacclass object. 
II the host_table_class object that will be the 
II new entry to the database (vector),is passed in by value. 
II Then we use the STL::vector member function "push_back(class T)" 




void host_table _ vector::add _host_table(host_table _class host_table) 
hosts _ tables. push _ back(host_table); 
return; 
}llend add_host_table(host_table_c1ass host_table) 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: remove _ host(int host) 
Ilretum value: none 
Ilparameters: int host 
Ilpurpose: This function is a service to the nacclass object. 
II here only the host (hosUd) is required in order to find the 
II corresponding entry (host_key object) and remove it. A vector 
II iterator is used to traverse the vector object, find the entry and 
II remove it. Multiple entries are removed also. We use the STL::vector 
II member function "erase(iterator i)" that removes the object pointed 




void host_table_ vector::remove_host_table(int host) 
Iitraverse the vector 
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for (host_table _ database::iterator i= hosts _ tables.beginO; 
i!=hosts_tables.endO; i++){ 
Ilifyou fmd the host 





}llend remove _host_ table(int host) 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: is_host_authorized(int host) 
Ilretum value: boolean 
Ilparameters: int host 
Ilpurpose: This function is a service to the nac object. 
II here only the host (hosUd) is required in order to fmd if 
II a corresponding entry (host_key object) exists.A vector 
II iterator is used to traverse the vector object.Only one appearance is 
II enough to make the return value "true". True means that there exists 
II a host_table entry in the nac's database, therefore the host is 
II authorized to send traffic 
11-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
bool host_table_vector: :is _ host_authorized(int host) 
{ 
Illocal variable 
boo I host_exists = false; 
Iitraverse the vector 
for (host_table_database::jterator i= hosts_tables.beginO; 
i!=hosts_tables.endO; i++) {ilsaferthan int i etc 
Ilifyou fmd the hosUd 
if (i->hosUd _is() == host){ 
host_exists = true; 






}llend is_host_authorized(int host) 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: key jor _host_ ki(int host, int ki) 
Ilretum value: int, the key 
Ilparameters: int host, int ki 
Ilpurpose: This function is a service to the nac object. 
II here only the host (hosUd) is required in order to fmd if 
II a corresponding entry (host_key object) exists.A vector 
II iter:ator is used to traverse the vector object. The entry for host 
II is found and a handler to the tablecJass object of this entry is 
II returned. The function now uses the service of the tablecJass object 




int host_table_vector: :key jor _ host_ki(int host, int ki) 
Illocal handler to the table 
tabJecJass *tableptr; 
Iitraverse the vector and look for that host entry 
for (host_table_database::iterator i= hosts_tables.beginO; 
i!=hosts_tables.endO; i++){llsafer than int i etc 
Iialternatively IF int i had been used to traverse 
Ilwe could use: 
Ilif (hosts _tables.operator[](i).hosUd _isO = host) { 
II tableptr = hosts _tables.operator[](i).table _isO; 
if (i->hosUd_isO == host) { 
Iia local hanler to the table of the host 





//use the service provided by the tableclass to the friends 
return (tableptr -> look_up_tablejor_key(ki)); 
}//end keyjor_host_ki 
I I -------------------------------------------------------------------------____ _ 
lifunction: print_ vectorO 
Ilretum value: none 
Ilparameters: none 
//purpose: FOR DEBUGGING PURPOSES ONLY. 
/ / ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
void host_table_vector: :print_ vectorO 
{ 
for (host_table_database::iterator i= hosts_tables.beginO; 
i!=hosts _ tables.endO; itt ){Ilsafer 
cout«"for host:"« i->host_id_isO 
« " ki_key table is:" «endl; 




Ilend host_table_vector.cpp file 
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#ifndef _ host_ticket_ class _ H_ 
#defme host ticket class H 
- - - --
V***************************************************** ************************* 
V***************************************************** ************************* 
I I File: host_ ticket_ class.h 
II Name: Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: MS Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver 5.0 
II Date: 19 September 1998 
II Description:This is the class that contains the hosUd and the name of 
II the file that contains the ticket. The objects are created by 
II the host class and are sent to the nac for further authorization 
II (getting a tableclass)so the host can start sending trafficll 
II to the naco The necessary functions to access the data are also 
II provided. 
II 
II Assumptions: The file that contains the ticket is encrypted with the 







class host_ticket_class { 
friend class nacclass; 
Iloverioading of operators 
friend ostream& operator< « ostream&, const host_ ticket_ class&); 






explicit host_ticket_c1ass(int hosUd, 
char* ticket_file); 









char* ticket_file _isOconst {retum( ticket_file);} 
#endif 




II File: hosUicket_class.cpp 
II Name: Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: MS Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver 5.0 
II Date: 19 September 1998 
II Description:same as in host_ticket_ class.h 
II 






#include "host ticket class.h" 
- -
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: default constructor 
Ilretum value: a host_ticket_class object 
Ilparameters: none 
Ilpurpose: the initial values are entered in order to be able to check the 
II existance of a host-id and a file name. The host_ticket_class object 
II is initialized with hostjd:-1 and file name: "notexists". 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
host_ticket_ class::host_ticket_ class 0: 
hostjd(-l),ticket_ file("notexists"){ } 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: another constructor 
Ilretum value: a host_ticket_class object 
Ilparameters: int hostjd, char* ticket_file 
Ilpurpose: the host_id and the ticket_file name are entered to the created 
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host_ticket_ class::host_ticket_ class (int hosUd, char* ticket_file): 
hosUd(hosUd),ticket_ file(ticket_file) {} 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: destructor 
Ilreturn value: none 
Ilparameters: none 
Ilpurpose: destroys "this" host_ticket_class object 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
host_ ticket_class: :-host_ ticket_ classO {} 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: ostream& operator< « ostream& out, const host_ ticket_ class& MY _ HT) 
Ilretum value:ostream& 
Ilparameters: ostream out,host_ ticket_ class& MY _ HT 
Ilpurpose: a user defined class has to defme how« behaves. 
II In our case if the host_ticket_c1ass object passed in by ref 
II has not been initialized (hosUd and ticket_file are 
II not valid) then we only inform the user that the object does not 
II exist, otherwise we display the host_id and the ticket file name. 
II 
Ilremark: even one unitialized value would lead to an invalid object 
11------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
ostream& operator«(ostream& out, const host_ticket_c1ass& MY_HT) 
{ 
if «MY _HT.hosUd <0 )&& 
(MY _ HT.ticket_ file == "notexists"»{ 
Ilfor some reason the key_ticket object is not there 
out« "<host_ticket object does not exist>"«endl; 
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} 
else if (MY _HT.hosUd < 0 ){ 
} 
Ilfor some reason the key_ticket object's session_key is not there 
out«"<host_ticket object.host_id does not exist> "« endl; 
else if (MY _ HT.ticket_file="notexists"){ 
} 
Ilfor some reason the key_ticket object's ticket_file is not there 
out«"<host_ticket objectticket_file does not exist> "« endl; 





}fIend operator«(ostream& out, const host_ticket_class& MY_HT) 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: istream& operator> >(istream& in, host_ ticket_ cIass& my _ ht ) 
Ilretum value:istream& 
Ilparameters: istream& in,host_ticket_cIass my_ht 
Ilpurpose: a user defmed class has to defme how» behaves. 
II Here we input the two values to the host_ticket_class object 
lion the RHS 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 




}ffend operator»(istream& in, host_ticket_class& my_ht) 
ffend file host_ticket_ cIass.cpp 
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II File: hostclass.h 
II Name: Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: MS Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver 5.0 
II Date: 19 September 1998 
~ Description: the hostclass simulates the functionality of a host that wants 
II to get authorization from kerberos, obtain a ticket and a session 
II key, contact nac, obtain a key-table and start sending 
II ipyackets formatted in accordance we the protocol we propose. 
I I The hostclass object data consist of a hosUd, host_key and a 
I I user _ id. So we consider the user is part of this entity (object). 
II The functionality is devided to three parts: the kerberos part 
II the nac part and ipyacket part. 
II 
II Assumptions: none 
II 




#include "ip yacketclass.h" 
#include "tableclass.h" 
#include "ticketclass.h" 
#include "host_ticket_ class.h" 








Iinames of the files are specified in the constants.h 
Ilwe use files to deposit and retrieve information easily 
extern const char* MESSAGE_FILE; 




Iluser defmed constructor 







lifunctionality with kerberos 
I I ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
lithe host requests authentication from the kerb eros module 
Ilpassing the hosUd, host_key and userjd to the appropriate kerb function 
Ilpostcondition: now the host has the name of the file that contains 
II the session_key and the ticket. The file and the ticket should be 
II encrypted. We do not use encryption in this simulation. 
I I ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
bool request_ authentication(kerberosclass &kerberos); 
I I ---------------------------------------------------------------------------




lithe file with the info for the nac: host id and ticket is created and 
lithe function returns the file name 





IINAC prepares a file containing a key-table, this filename is the argument 
Ilofthis function 
Ilpostcondition: the host extracts the table ofki_keys from the file 
II and the table object in the host is instantiated. 
I I --------:------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
void hostc1ass::get_table(const char* TABLE]ILE_NAME); 
I I ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunctionality with ip -packet 
I I ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
lithe message_file name is passed in, the host prepares an ip-packetc1ass 
Ilobject and returns it 
Ilpostcondition: a new ip -packetclass object is created. 
I I ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 















Ilpostcondition: data members session_key and ticket file are defined. 
I I ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
void get_session _ keyO; 
} ;fIend hostclass 
#endif 




II File: hostclass.cpp 
II Name: Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: MS Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver 5.0 
II Date: 19 September 1998 














I I ------------------------------------------------------------_________________ _ 
lifunction: constructor 
Ilretum value: a hostclass object 
Ilparameters: int host_id,char* host_ key,char* user _id 
Ilpurpose: creates a hostclass object with the values of the parameters 
I I passed in. 
I / -------------------------------------------------------------------__________ _ 
II 
hostclass::hostclass(int host_id,char* host_key,char* user_id): 
hosUd (hosUd), 





Ilretum value: none 
Ilparameters: none 
Ilpurpose: destroys "this" hostclass object. 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
hostclass: :-hostclassO {} 
Ilmember functions 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------




lifunction: request_ authentication(kerberosclass &kerberos) 
Ilretum value: bool 
Ilparameters: kerberosclass &kerberos 
Ilpurpose: the host requests authentication from the kerberos module 
II passing the hosUd, host_key and user_id to the appropriate 
II kerberos function. Returns true if an entry exists in the 
II kerberos databases for both the user and the host. 
Ilpostcondition: the host obtains the file that contains the session_key and 
II the ticketfile name and extracts the session key using the auxilliary 
II function "get_session_key". 
II 
Ilremarks: here we assume that the driver program will allow 
II for a reference to a kerberos object 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
bool hostclass: :request_ authentication(kerberosclass &kerberos) 
Ilat the beginning 
bool authenticated = false; 
Iluse kerberos functionality 
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if(kerberos.request-pennission(useUd,hostjd»{ 
Ilget the encrypted file with the sessionkey and the ticketfile name 
key_ticket_file = 
const_ cast<char*>(kerberos.send _key _ ticket(hostjd»; 
authenticated = true; 
}llendif 
Iiso the host can proceed and extract the session key 
get_session_keyO; 
return authenticated; 
} I lend request_authentication(kerberosclass &kerberos) 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: get_session _ keyO 
Ilreturn va.Iue: none 
Ilparameters: none 
Ilpurpose: a utility function that reads from the file that kerberos 
I I created the session_key and the encrypted ticketfile name 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
void hostclass: :get_ session _ keyO 
{ 
Iia local variable to read in from the file 
key _ ticket_ class key_ticket; 
IlfIrst need to decrypt the file,use host's key(NOT IMPLEMENTED) 
Iidecrypt(key _ticket_file, "hostkey"); 
Ilopen the file to get a value (for input) 
fstream in (key _ticket_file, ios::in); 
Iluse overloaded » 
in» key_ticket; 
Ilinstantiate this hostclass object's data members 
session_key = key _ ticket.session _key _ isO; 










Ilretum v'!lue: none 
Ilparameters: none 
Ilpurpose:the host creates a host_ticket_class object (contains the host_id 
II and the ticketfile name) opens a file and dumps the object 
II in the file. The function returns the name of this file. 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
char* hostclass::send _ticketO 
lithe host opens a file and puts inside the hosUd 
Iland the name of the ticketfile 
host_ ticket_class host_ ticket(hosUd,ticket_ file); 
Ilopen the file for output 
fstream out(HOST_TICKET]ILE, ios::out); 
Iluse overloaded « 
out«host_ticket; 
I Ifor safety 
out.closeO; 




llfunction: geUable(const char* TABLE]ILE_NAME) 
Ilretum value: none 
Ilparameters: const char* TABLE]ILE_NAME 
Ilpurpose:the host opens a file that was created by the nac and contains the 
II ki- key table. 
Ilpostcondition: the tableclass object data member is instantiated. 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
void hostclass::get_table(const char* TABLE]ILE_NAME) 
{ 
lithe file should be decrypted using the session key (NOT IMPLEMENTED) 
Ildecrypt(T ABLE ]ILE _NAME, "sesskey") 
Ilopen the file input 
fstream in(TABLE]ILE_NAME, ios::in); 
lire ad in the table, use overloade» 
in» ki_key_table; 
return; 
}llend get_table(const char* TABLE]ILE_NAME) 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------




lifunction: create _ message( char* message_file) 
Ilreturn value: none 
Ilparameters: char* message_file 
Ilpurpose:the host prepares an ip....packetclass object. First, we get the new 
II ki and the next key from the key-table.Then we copy the message file 
II to buffer, append the key and hash the whole file 
II thus creating the MAC. 





ip -packetcIass hostcIass: :create _ message( char* message_file) 
Iia pointer to a buffer to be used for MD5(buffer) 
char* message_buffer; 
char* temp_buffer= new char[MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE]; 
static int new _ ki; 
static int indicator=O; 
static time_t start_time; 
time _ t current_time; 
if (indicator==O) {Ilits the first time 
start _ time=time(O); 
new_ki = ktkey_table.get_next_kiO; 
indicator= 1 ; 
current_time=time(O); 
lithe next ki and key are being requested for the message 
Iluse table functionality 
if « current_time-start _time» T _ ZERO){ 
cout«"**The old key's cryptoperiod has expired.A new key is valid**\n" 
«endl; 
new_ki = ktkey_table.get_next_kiO; 
lire set the timer 
start_time=time(O); 
lithe message_file contents are put in a buffer and 
lithe key is appended to it 
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Iithis is done in order to keep the message_file clean 
temp_buffer = copytobuffer(message _ file, temp _ buffer,new _ ki,next_ key); 
message_buffer = new char [strlen(temp_buffer)+ 1]; 
strcpy (message_buffer, temp_buffer); 
delete[] temp_buffer; 
II mdS is CALLED FOR THE BUFFER 
unsigned char* mac = MDSString (message_buffer); 
Ilcreate a new ip packet 
ip --'packetclass * messageptr = new ip --'packetclass(hosUd, 
message _ file,new _ ki,mac); 
r~tum *messageptr; 
}llend create_message 
Ilend file hostclass.cpp 
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#ifndef _ip yacketclass _ H_ 
#defme _ip yacketclass _ H_ 
v****************************************************************************** 
v****************************************************************************** 
II File: ipyacketclass.h 
II Name: Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: MS Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver 5.0 
II Date: 19 September 1998 
II Description: the ipyacketclass objects (ipyackets) are used by the 
II hostclass and the nacclass. 
II The hostclass prepares them and the nacclass 
II authenticates them. The information contained in each ipyacket 
II (data) is the hostjd of the host that prepared the packet, 
II the ki of the packet, the filename of the message data,and 










class ip yacketclass { 
Ilfriend class 







explicit ip yacketcIass(int id,char* data _ file,int ki,unsigned char* mac); 
Ilcopy constructor 
IINOT NECESSARY FOR THE MOMENT 
Ilip yacketcIass (const ip yacketcIass &); 






lithe filename that contains the message 
char *filename; 
11128 bits 
unsigned char* mac; 
Ilmember functions for friends 
unsigned char* mac_isOconst{return mac;} 
int kUsOconst {return ki;} 
char* filename _isOconst{return filename;} 
int hosUsOconst{return hosUd;} 
};llend ipyacket class 
#endif 




II File: ip -packetc\ass.cpp 
II Name: Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: MS Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver 5.0 
II Date: 19 September 1998 
II Description: same as in the header file 
II 







lifunction: default constructor 
Ilretum value: an ip-packetc\ass object 
Ilparameters: none 
Ilpurpose: the initial values are entered in order to be able to check the 
Ilexistance of the packet 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 





lifunction: another constructor 
Ilretum value: a ip -packetclass object 
Ilparameters: int id (hosUd), char* data file, int ki, char* mac 
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Ilpurpose: an ipyacketclass object with initial values 
II the parameters passed has been created by a hostclass object 
I 1----------------------------------------------------------------------_______ _ 
II 
ipyacketclass::ipyacketclass(int id, char* data_file, 
int ki,unsigned char* mac): 
filename(data_file), ki(ki), hosUd (id), mac (mac){} 
I I -------------------------------------------------------------------__________ _ 
lifunction: destructor 
Ilreturn value: none 
Ilparameters: none 
Ilpurpose: destroys "this" ipyacketclass object 
I 1----------:----------------------------------------------------------________ _ 
II 
ip yacketclass::-ip yacketclassO {} 




II File: ipj>acketc1ass.cpp 
II Name: Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: MS Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver 5.0 
II Date: 19 September 1998 
II Description: same as in the header file 
II 





#inc1ude "ip j>acketc1ass.h" 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: default constructor 
Ilretum value: an ipj>acketc1ass object 
Ilparameters: none 
Ilpurpose: the initial values are entered in order to be able to check the 
Ilexistance of the packet 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 





lifunction: another constructor 
Ilretum value: a ipj>acketc1ass object 
Ilparameters: int id (hosUd), char* data file, int ki, char* mac 
Ilpurpose: an ipj>acketclass object with initial values 
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II the parameters passed has been created by a hostclass object 
I I -------------------------------------------------------------------__________ _ 
II 
ip --'packetclass::ip --'packetclass(int id, char* data_file, 
int ki,unsigned char* mac): 
filename(data_file), ki(ki), hosUd (id), mac (mac){} 
I I ----------------------------------------------------------------------------__ 
lifunction: destructor 
Ilretum value: none 
Ilparameters: none 
Ilpurpose: destroys "this" ip--'packetclass object 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
ip --'packetclass: :-ip --'packetclassO {} 




II File: kerberosclass.cpp 
II Name: Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: MS Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver 5.0 
II Date: 19 September 1998 




II Warnings: they are inherited from the STL vector. they do not cause 





lifunction: default constructor 
Ilreturn value: a kerberosclass object 
Ilparameters: none 
Ilpurpose: creates a kerberosclass object with two empty databases 
I I one for users and one for host_key _class objects 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
kerberosclass: :kerberosclassO {} 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: destructor 
Ilreturn value: none 
Ilparameters: none 







lifunction: register.)lOst(int hosUd,char* host_key) 
Ilreturn value: none 
Ilparameters: int hosUd, char* host_key 
Ilpurpose: it adds an entry to the host_key database ofkerberos; therefore, it 
II registers a host 
Ilremarks: as we mentioned in the header file description the programmer has to 
II take care of the registration process in the driver of the simulation. 
II The programmer plays the role of the secure key distribution mean 
II between the kerberos and the host. The vector object's functionality 
II is us~d to add the entry to the database 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
void kerberosclass::register_host(int host_id, 
char* host_key) 
{ Iluse vector's functionality 




lifunction: remove_host(int hosUd) 
Ilreturn value: none 
Ilparameters: int host_id 
Ilpurpose: it removes an entry from the host_key database ofkerberos 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
void kerberosclass::remove _ host(int host_id) 
{ Iluse vector's functionality 





lifunction: register_user (char* user_id) 
Ilreturn value: none 
Ilparameters: char* userjd 
Ilpurpose: it adds an entry (actually a char*) to the user database ofkerberos; 
II therefore, it registers a user 
Ilremarks: as we mentioned in the header file description, the programmer has to 
II take care of the user registration process in the driver of the 
II simulation. 
II The user registers in a "naive" way with kerberos using the user id. 
II We decided this only for simplification purposes for the 
II simulation. The vector object's member function "push_back(class T)" 
II is used to add the entry to the database 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
void kerberosclass::register_user (char* user_id) 
{ Iluse the vector functionality 
user _ database. push _ back(user _id); 
return ; 
} I I end register_user 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: remove_user (char* user_id) 
Ilreturn value: none 
Ilparameters: char* userjd 
Ilpurpose: it removes an entry (actually a char*) from the user database of 
II kerberos. An iterator is used to traverse the database and the member 
II function of vector "erase(iterator i) is used to remove the vector 
II entry pointed by i. 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
void kerberosclass: :remove _user (char* user _id) 
Iitraverse the vector 
for (user_vector:: iterator i= user _ database.beginO; 
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i!=user_database.endO; i++){ 
Ilifyou fmd the user entry 
if ((*i)= user_id){ 






lifunction: requestyermission( char* user _ id,int hosUd) 
Ilreturn value: boo I 
Ilparameters: char* user_id,int host_id 
Ilpurpose~ simulates the kerberos authentication process. 
II A user_id, at a host_id, requests permission to access the nacclass 
II object for further packet forwarding. If the host is registered and 
II the user is registered then the return value is "true" (the host has 
II permission).Otherwise "false". 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
bool kerberosclass: :request yermission( char* user _ id, 
int hosUd) 
boo I user_exists = false; 
bool permission_granted = false; 
IlfIrst lookup the database of hosts 
Iluse the object's member function 
bool host_exists = host_key _ database.is _ hostJegistered(hosUd); 
Iithen lookup the database of users 
Iitraverse the user database (vector) with an iterator 
for (user_ vector::iterator i= user_database.beginO; 
i!=user_database.endO; i++){ 
Ilif you fmd the user registered 
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if (strcmp«*i), user_id)==O){ 
user_exists = true; 
}llend if 
}llend for 
Iionly ifboth are registered 
if (host_exists && user_exists) { 
permission_granted = true; 
}llendif 
return permission ~ranted; 
}llend requestyermission 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: create_session _ keyO 
Ilreturn value: char* 
Ilparameters: none 
Ilpurpose: to create the session key the host needs to communicate with the naco 
II In a more elaborate prototype a key_generator should be used. 
II Here we stub the key to the string:"sesskey". 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 





lifunction: create_ticket(int hostjd, char* session_key) 
Ilretum value: a ticketclass object 
Ilparameters: int host_id,char* session_key 
Ilpurpose: the host needs a ticket to be accepted by the naco 
II Normally a ticket would have more information like a timestamp. 
II We simplify the ticket to be only the hostjd and 





ticketclass kerberosclass: : create _ ticket( int host_ id, 
char* session_key) 
Ilcreate a ticketClass object 
ticketclass current_ticket (hosUd, session_key); 
return (current_ticket); 
}llend create_ticket(int hosUd, char* session_key) 
I I --------------------------------------------------------------------------___ _ 
lifunction: send_key _ ticket(int hosUd) 
Ilretum value: const char* (a file name) 
Ilparameters: int hosUd 
Ilpurpose: the kerberos creates a session key and a ticket for the host. 
II It then puts the ticket to file (TICKET]ILE).(This file should be 
II encrypted with the selected encryption metbod using the 
II KEY OF THE NAC that Kerberos knows, we don't do it here). 
II The name of the file and the session key are used to create 
II a key_ticket_class object that is put to a file (KEY_TICKET]ILE. 
II (This file should be encrypted with the selected encryption metbod 
II but using the KEY OF THE HOST that Kerberos knows, again we skip 
II this step). The name of the file is returned (to the host). 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
const char* kerberosclass::send _key _ticket(int host_id) 
{ 
Ilcreate a session key 
char* session_key = create_session _ keyO; 
Iland a ticket to be send to nac 
tiCketclass ticket = create _ticket(hosUd ,session .J<:ey); 
Ilopen a file to put the ticket 
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fstream t_out(TICKET]ILE, ios::out); 
Iinow put the created ticket in this file 
Iluse the overloaded operator 
t_out« ticket; 
I Ifor safety 
t_ out.closeO; 
//apply encryption to the file, use NAC's key (NOT IMPLEMENTED): 
Ilencrypt(TI CKET _FILE, "nackey") 
Ilcreate the key _ticket_class to be returned 
IlcontaiQs the session_key and the ticket_file name 
key _ticket_class key _ticket(session _ key,const_ cast<char*>(TICKET ]ILE»; 
Ilopen a file to put the key_ticket_class object 
fstream kt_ out(KEY _TICKET ]ILE, ios: :out); 
Iluse the overloaded operator 
kt_ out< <key_ticket; 
Ilapply encryption to the file use HOST's key (NOT IMPLEMENTED): 
lien crypt (TICKET]ILE,"hostkey") 
I Ifor safety 
kt_ out.closeO; 
Ilreturn the name of the file that contains all 
return (KEY_TICKET ]ILE); 
} I lend send_key _ ticket(int hosUd) 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------





lifunction: print_ usersO 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
void kerberosclass::print_users () 
Iitraverse the vector 
for (user_vector::iterator i = user_database.beginO; 
i!=user _ database.endO; i++){ 
Ilifyou fmd the user entry 





lifunction: printyosts _ keysO 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 




Ilend file kerberosclass.cpp 
149 
#ifndef _key _ticket_class _ H_ 
#defme _key-ticket_class _ H_ 
v****************************************************************************** 
v****************************************************************************** 
II File: key_ticket_class.h 
II Name: Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: MS Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver 5.0 
II Date: 19 September 1998 
II Description:This is the class that contains the session key and the name of 
II the file that contains the ticket. The objects are created by 
II ¢.e kerberos class and are sent to the host that 
II requested for authentication and a session key to send traffic 
II to the naco The necessary functions to access the data are also 
II provided. 
II 
II Assumptions: The file that contains the ticket is encrypted with the 







class key_ticket_class { 
Iloverloading of operators 
friend ostream& operator< « ostream&, const key-ticket_ class&); 
friend istream& operator»(istream&, key_ticket_class&); 
public: 
Iidefault constructor 
key _ ticket_ classO; 
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Ilanother constructor 
explicit key _ ticket_ class( char* session_key, 
char* ticket_file); 
I I destructor 
-key _ ticket_ classO; 
11m ember functions 
char* session_key_isOconst{return (session_key);} 
char* ticket_fileJsOconst{return (ticket_file);} 
private: 
Iidata 
char* se.ssion _key; 
char* ticket_file; 





II File: key_ticket_class.cpp 
II Name: Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: MS Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver 5.0 
II Date: 19 September 1998 
II Description:same as in key _ ticket_ class.h file 






#include "key _ticket_ class.h" 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: default constructor 
Ilretum value: a keLticket_class object 
Ilparameters: none 
Ilpurpose: the initial values are entered in order to be able to check the 
II existance of a key and a file name.The key _ticket_class object is 
II initialized with "notexists" strings 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
key _ticket_ class::key _ticket_class 0: 
session _ key("notexists"),ticket_ file("notexists ") {} 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: another constructor 
Ilretum value: a key_ticket_class object 
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Ilparameters: char* session_key, char* ticket_file 
Ilpurpose: the session_key and the ticket_file name are entered to the created 
II object by kerberos. The object is going to be sent to the host for further 
II usage. 
I I --------------------------------------------------------------------------___ _ 
II 
key_ticket_class::key_ticket_class (char* session_key, char* ticket_file): 
session _ key( session_ key),ticket_fiIe(ticket_ file){} 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: destructor 
Ilretum value: none 
Ilparameters: none 
Ilpurpose:.destroys "this" key_ticket_class object 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
key _ ticket_class: :-key _ ticket_ classO {} 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: ostream& operator«(ostream& out, const key_ticket_class& MY_KT) 
Ilretum value:ostream& 
Ilparameters: ostream out,key _ ticket_class MY _ KT 
Ilpurpose: a user defmed class has to define how« behaves. 
I I In our case if the key _ ticket_class object passed in by ref 
II has not been initialized (session_key and ticket_file strings are 
II not valid) then we only inform the user that the object does not 
II exist, otherwise we display the two strings. 
II 
Ilremark: even one unitialized value would lead to an invalid object 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
ostream& operator«(ostream& out, const key_ticket_class& MY_KT) 
{ 
if «MY_KT.session_key = "notexists")&& 
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} 
(MY _KT.ticket_file == nnotexistsn){ 
Ilfor some reason the key_ticket object is not there 
out« n<key_ticket object does not exist>n«endl; 
else if (MY _ KT.session _key = nnotexistsn){ 
Ilfor some reason the key_ticket object's session_key is not there 
out«n<key_ticket object.session_key does not exist> n« endl; 
else if (MY _KT.tickeUile=nnotexistsn){ 
} 
Ilfor some reason the key_ticket object's ticket_file is not there 
out«n<key _ticket objectticket_file does not exist> n« endl; 
else {Ileverything exists 
.out« MY_KT.session_key«endl; 
out « MY _KT.ticket_file«endl; 
}llend if 
return out; 
} I lend operator< « ostream& out, const key _ ticket_ class& MY _ KT) 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: istream& operator»(istream& in, key_ticket_class& my_kt) 
Ilretum value: istream& 
Ilparameters: istream& in,key _ ticket_class my _ kt 
Ilpurpose: a user defined class has to defme how» behaves. 
II Here we input the two values to the key_ticket_class object 
lion the RHS 
I I ---------------------------.---------------------------------------------------
/I 
istream& operator»(istream& in, key _ticket_ class& my _kt ) 
in »my_kt.session_key; 
in »my _kt.ticket_file; 
return in; 
}llend operator»(istream& in, key_ticket_class& my_kt) 
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Ilend file key_ticket_class.cpp 
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#ifndef _ mdS _ H_ 
#defme _mdS _ H_ 
/* MDS.H - header file for MDSC.C 
*/ 
/* Copyright (C) 1991-2, RSA Data Security, Inc. Created 1991. All 
rights reserved. 
License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it 
is identified as the "RSA Data Security, Inc. MDS Message-Digest 
Algorithm" in all material mentioning or referencing this software 
or this function. 
License is. also granted to make and use derivative works provided 
that such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Data 
Security, Inc. MDS Message-Digest Algorithm" in all material 
mentioning or referencing the derived work. 
RSA Data Security, Inc. makes no representations concerning either 
the merchantability of this software or the suitability of this 
software for any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" 
without express or implied warranty of any kind. 
These notices must be retained in any copies of any part of this 
documentation and/or software. 
*/ 
#include "global.h" 
/* MDS context. * / 
typedef struct { 
UINT4 state[4]; /* state (ABCD) */ 
UINT4 count[2]; /* number of bits, modulo 2"64 (Isb first) */ 
unsigned char buffer[64]; /* input buffer */ 
} MDS_CTX; 
void MDSInit /*PROTO _ LIST* / (MDS _ CTX *); 
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void MD5Update /*PROTO _ LIST* / 
(MD5 _ CTX *, unsigned char *, unsigned int); 
void MD5Final /*PROTO_LIST*/ (unsigned char [16], MD5_CTX *); 
#endif 
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/* MD5C.C - RSA Data Security, Inc., MD5 message-digest algorithm 
*/ 
/* Copyright (C) 1991-2, RSA Data Security, Inc. Created 1991. All 
rights reserved. 
License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it 
, is identified as the "RSA Data Security, Inc. MD5 Message-Digest 
Algorithm" in all material mentioning or referencing this software 
or this function. 
License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided 
that such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Data 
Security, I.nc. MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm" in all material 
mentioning or referencing the derived work. 
RSA Data Security, Inc. makes no representations concerning either 
the merchantability of this software or the suitability of this 
software for any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" 
without express or implied warranty of any kind. 
These notices must be retained in any copies of any part of this 





/* Constants for MD5Transform routine. 
*/ 
#defme Sll 7 
#define S 12 12 
#defme S13 17 
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#defme S 14 22 
#defme S21 5 
#defme S22 9 
#defme S23 14 
#defme S24 20 
#defme S314 
#defme S32 11 
#defme S33 16 
#defme S34 23 
#defme S41 6 
#defme S42 10 
#defme S43 15 
#defme S44 21 
static void MD5Transfonn /*PROTO_LIST*/ (UINT4 [4], unsigned char [64]); 
static void Encode /*PROTO _ LIST* / 
(unsigned char *, UINT4 *, unsigned int); 
static void Decode /*PROTO _ LIST* / 
(UINT4 *, unsigned char *, unsigned int); 
static void MD5_memcpy /*PROTO_LIST*/ (POINTER, POINTER, unsigned int); 
static void MD5 _ memset /*PROTO _ LIST* / (POINTER, int, unsigned int); 
static unsigned char PADDING[64] = { 
Ox80,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 
}; 
/* F, G, H and I are basic MD5 functions. 
*/ 
#defme F(x, y, z) «(x) & (y» I «-x) & (z») 
#defme G(x, y, z) «(x) & (z» I «y) & (-z»)) 
#defme H(x, y, z) «x) /\ (y) /\ (z» 
#defme I(x, y, z) «y) /\ «x) I (-z») 
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/* ROTATE_LEFT rotates x left n bits. 
*/ 
#define ROTATE _ LEFT(x, n) (((x) « (n» I ((x) » (32-(n»» 
/* FF, GG, HH, and II transformations for rounds 1,2,3, and 4. 
Rotation is separate from addition to prevent recomputation. 
*/ 
#defme FF(a, b, c, d, x, s, ac) {\ 
(a) += F ((b), (c), (d» + (x) + (UINT4)(ac); \ 
(a) = ROTATE_LEFT ((a), (s»; \ 
(a) += (b); \ 
} 
#defme GG(a, b, c, d, x, s, ac) {\ 
(a) += G ((b), (c), (d» + (x) + (UINT4)(ac); \ 
(a) = ROTATE_LEFT ((a), (s»; \ 
(a) += (b); \ 
} 
#define HH(a, b, c, d, x, s, ac) { \ 
(a) += H ((b), (c), (d» + (x) + (UINT4)(ac); \ 
(a) = ROTATE_LEFT ((a), (s»; \ 
(a) += (b); \ 
} 
#defme I1(a, b, c, d, x, s, ac) { \ 
(a) += I ((b), (c), (d» + (x) + (UINT4)(ac); \ 
(a) = ROTATE_LEFT ((a), (s»; \ 
(a) += (b); \ 
} 
/* MD5 initialization. Begins an MD5 operation, writing a new context. 
*/ 
void MD5Init (context) 
MD5_CTX *context; 
context->count[O] = context->count[l] = 0; 
/* Load magic initialization constants. 




context->state[O] = Ox674S2301; 
context->state[l] = Oxefcdab89; 
context->state[2] = Ox98badcfe; 
context->state[3] = Ox1032S476; 
/* MDS block update operation. Continues an MDS message-digest 
operation, processing another message block, and updating the 
context. 
*/ 
void MDSUpdate (context, input, inputLen) 
MDS _ CTX *context; /* context * / 
unsigned ~har *input; 
unsigned int inputLen; 
/* input block */ 
/* length of input block * / 
{ 
unsigned int i, index, partLen; 
/* Compute number of bytes mod 64 */ 
index = (unsigned int)((context->count[O] »3) & Ox3F); 
/* Update number of bits */ 
if ((context->count[O] += ((UINT4)inputLen« 3» 
< ((UINT4)inputLen « 3» 
context ->count[ 1 ]++; 
context->count[l] += ((UINT4)inputLen» 29); 
partLen = 64 - index; 
/* Transform as many times as possible. 
*/ 
if (inputLen >= partLen) { 
MDS_memcpy 
((POINTER)&context->buffer[index], (POINTER)input, partLen); 
MDSTransform (context->state, context->buffer); 
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for (i = partLen; i + 63 < inputLen; i += 64) 
MD5Transfonn (context->state, &input[i]); 
index = 0; 
else 
i=O; 





/* MD5 fmalization. Ends an MD5 message-digest operation, writing the 
the message digest and zeroizing the context. 
*/ 
void MD5Finai (digest, context) 
unsigned char digest[ 16]; 
MD5 _ CTX *context; 
{ 
unsigned char bits[8]; 
unsigned int index, padLen; 
/* Save number of bits * / 
Encode (bits, context->count, 8); 
/* Pad out to 56 mod 64. 
*/ 
/* message digest */ 
/* context * / 
index = (unsigned int)«context->count[O] » 3) & Ox3f); 
padLen = (index < 56) ? (56 - index) : (120 - index); 
MD5Update (context, PADDING, padLen); 
/* Append length (before padding) * / 
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MDSUpdate (context, bits, 8); 
/* Store state in digest * / 
Encode (digest, context->state, 16); 
/* Zeroize sensitive infonnation. 
*/ 
MDSJI1emset ((POINTER)context, 0, sizeof(*context»; 
/* MDS basic transfonnation. Transfonns state based on block. 
*/ 
static void MDSTransfonn (state, block) 
UINT4 state[4]; 
unsigned .char block[ 64]; 
UINT4 a = state[O], b = state[l], c = state[2], d = state[3], x[16]; 
Decode (x, block, 64); 
/* Round I */ 
FF (a, b, c, d, x[ 0], Sll, Oxd76aa478); /* I */ 
FF (d, a, b, c, x[ 1], S12, Oxe8c7b7S6); /* 2 */ 
FF (c, d, a, b, x[ 2], S13, Ox242070db); /* 3 */ 
FF (b, c, d, a, x[ 3], S14, Oxclbdceee); /* 4 */ 
FF (a, b, c, d, x[ 4], SII, OxfS7cOfai); /* S */ 
FF (d, a, b, c, x[ S], S12, Ox4787c62a); /* 6 */ 
FF (c, d, a, b, x[ 6], S13, Oxa8304613); /* 7 */ 
FF (b, c, d, a, x[ 7], S14, Oxfd469S01); /* 8 */ 
FF (a, b, c, d, x[ 8], SII, Ox698098d8); /* 9 */ 
FF (d, a, b, c, x[ 9], S12, Ox8b44f7ai); /* 10 */ 
FF (c, d, a, b, x[lO], S13, OxffffSbbl); /* II */ 
FF (b, c, d, a, x[ll], S14, Ox89Scd7be); /* 12 */ 
FF (a, b, c, d, x[12], SII, Ox6b901122); /* 13 */ 
FF (d, a, b, c, x[13], S12, Oxfd987193); /* 14 */ 
FF (c, d, a, b, x[14], S13, Oxa679438e); /* IS */ 
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FF (b, c, d, a, x[l5], S14, Ox49b4082 I); /* 16 */ 
/* Round 2 */ 
GG (a, b, c, d, x[ I], S21, Oxf6Ie2562); /* 17 */ 
GG (d, a, b, c, x[ 6], S22, Oxc040b340); /* 18 */ 
GG (c, d, a, b, x[ll], S23, Ox265e5a51); /* 19 */ 
GG (b, c, d, a, x[ 0], S24, Oxe9b6c7aa); /* 20 */ 
GG (a, b, c, d, x[ 5], S21, Oxd62fl05d); /* 21 */ 
GG (d, a, b, c, x[IO], S22, 0x244 1453); /* 22 */ 
GG (c, d, a, b, x[15], S23, Oxd8ale681); /* 23 */ 
GG (b, c, d, a, x[ 4], S24, Oxe7d3fbc8); /* 24 */ 
GG (a, b, c, d, x[ 9], S21, Ox2Ielcde6); /* 25 */ 
GG (d, a, b, c, x[l4], S22, Oxc33707d6); /* 26 */ 
GG (c, d, a, b, x[ 3], S23, Oxf4d50d87); /* 27 */ 
GG (b, c, d, a, x[ 8], S24, Ox455aI4ed); /* 28 */ 
GG (a, b, c, d, x[I3], S21, Oxage3e905); /* 29 */ 
GG (d, a, b, c, x[ 2], S22, Oxfcefa3f8); /* 30 */ 
GG (c, d, a, b, x[ 7], S23, Ox676fD2d9); /* 31 */ 
GG (b, c, d, a, x[I2], S24, Ox8d2a4c8a); /* 32 */ 
/* Round 3 */ 
HH (a, b, c, d, x[ 5], S31, Oxfffa3942); /* 33 */ 
HH (d, a, b, c, x[ 8], S32, Ox877 I f68 I); /* 34 */ 
HH (c, d, a, b, x[I I], S33, Ox6d9d6122); /* 35 */ 
HH (b, c, d, a, x[14], S34, Oxfde5380c); /* 36 */ 
HH (a, b, c, d, x[ I], S31, Oxa4beea44); /* 37 */ 
HH (d, a, b, c, x[ 4], S32, Ox4bdecfa9); /* 38 */ 
HH (c, d, a, b, x[ 7], S33, Oxf6bb4b60); /* 39 */ 
HH (b, c, d, a, x[IO], S34, Oxbebfbc70); /* 40 */ 
HH (a, b, c, d, x[13], S31, 0x289b7ec6); /* 41 */ 
HH (d, a, b, c, x[ 0], S32, OxeaaI27fa); /* 42 */ 
HH (c, d, a, b, x[ 3], S33, Oxd4ef3085); /* 43 */ 
HH (b, c, d, a, x[ 6], S34, Ox4881d05); /* 44 */ 
HH (a, b, c, d, x[ 9], S31, Oxd9d4d039); /* 45 */ 
HH (d, a, b, c, x[12], S32, Oxe6db9ge5); /* 46 */ 
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HH (c, d, a, b, x[15], S33, Oxlfa27cfB); /* 47 */ 
HH (b, c, d, a, x[ 2], S34, Oxc4ac5665); /* 48 */ 
/* Round 4 */ 
II (a, b, c, d, x[ 0], S41, Oxf4292244); /* 49 */ 
II (d, a, b, c, x[ 7], S42, Ox432aff97); /* 50 */ 
II (c, d, a, b, x[14], S43, Oxab9423a7); /* 51 */ 
II (b, c, d, a, x[ 5], S44, Oxfc93a039); /* 52 */ 
II (a, b, c, d, x[12], S41, Ox655b59c3); /* 53 */ 
II (d, a, b, c, x[ 3], S42, Ox8fOccc92); /* 54 */ 
II (c, d, a, b, x[10], S43, Oxffeff47d); /* 55 */ 
II (b, c, d, a, x[ 1], S44, Ox85845ddl); /* 56 */ 
II (a, b, c, d, x[ 8], S41, Ox6fa87e4f); /* 57 */ 
II (d, a, b, c, x[15], S42, Oxfe2ce6eO); /* 58 */ 
II (c, d, a, b, x[ 6], S43, Oxa3014314); /* 59 */ 
II (b, c, d, a, x[13], S44, Ox4e0811al); /* 60 */ 
II (a, b, c, d, x[ 4], S41, Oxf7537e82); /* 61 */ 
II (d, a, b, c, x[11], S42, Oxbd3af235); /* 62 */ 
II (c, d, a, b, x[ 2], S43, 0x2ad7d2bb); /* 63 */ 
II (b, c, d, a, x[ 9], S44, Oxeb86d391); /* 64 */ 
state[O] += a; 
state[l] += b; 
state[2] += c; 
state[3] += d; 
/* Zeroize sensitive information. 
*/ 
MD5_memset «POINTER)x, 0, sizeof(x»; 
/* Encodes input (UINT4) into output (unsigned char). Assumes len is 
a multiple of 4. 
*/ 
static void Encode (output, input, len) 
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unsigned char *output; 
UINT4 *input; 
unsigned int len; 
unsigned int i, j; 
for (i = O,j = O;j < len; i++,j += 4) { 
output[j] = (unsigned char)(input[i] & Oxff); 
output[j+l] = (unsigned char)((input[i]» 8) & Oxff); 
output[j+2] = (unsigned char)«input[i]» 16) & Oxff); 
output[j+3] = (unsigned char)«input[i] » 24) & Oxff); 
/* Decodes input (unsigned char) into output (UINT4). Assumes len is 
a multiple of 4. 
*/ 
static void Decode (output, input, len) 
UINT4 *output; 
unsigned char *input; 
unsigned int len; 
unsigned int i, j; 
for (i = O,j = O;j < len; i++,j += 4) 
output[i] = «UINT4)input[j]) I «(UINT4)input[j+ 1]) « 8) I 
«(UINT4)input[j+2])« 16) I «(UINT4)input[j+3])« 24); 
/* Note: Replace "for loop" with standard memcpy if possible. 
*/ 




unsigned int len; 
/* 
unsigned int i; 
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) 
output[i] = input[i]; 
*/ 
memcpy( output,input,len); 
/* Note: Replace "for loop" with standard memset if possible. 
*/ 
static voiq MD5_memset (output, value, len) 
POINTER output; 
int value; 
unsigned int len; 
/* 
unsigned int i; 
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) 
((char *)output)[i] = (char)value; 
*/ 
memset( output, value, len); 
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#ifndef _ nacc1ass _ H_ 
#defme _ nacc1ass _ H_ 
~****************************************************************************** 
~****************************************************************************** 
II File: nacc1ass.h 
II Name: Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: MS Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver 5.0 
II Date: 19 September 1998 
II Description: the nacc1ass simulates the functionality of our firewall-like 
II network access controller and demos the protocol that we propose 
II Nac has the functionality to check if a host is authorized by 
II kerberos to send packets by examining the host's ticket. It then 
II creates a tablec1ass object (tag_key table), puts a copy in a 
II file encrypts it with the session_key that was retrieved from the 
II ticket and returns the filename of the (encrypted) file to the 
II host.Nacc1ass object puts the hosUd and the tablec1ass object 
II in the hosts_tables_db database for further usage. 
II The nac authenticates the ip--packets that arrive.First a mac is 
I I calculated for the message of the ip --packet. The mac is 
II calculated after the (ip--packet's) ki corresponding key is 
II appended to the message. By comparing the two macs (calculated 
II and the one contained in the ip--packet) the nac decides if the 
II ip--packet is authorized for forwarding. 
II 










#include "host_table _ vector.h" 
#include "constants.h" 
#include "host_table_class.h" 
#include "host_key _ class.h" 




extern const char* TABLE]ILE; 
extern const char* HOST_TICKET]ILE; 
class nacclass{ 
public: 
II constractors destructors 
Iidefault constractor 
nacclass(); 




Iia host asks for a table by sending the filename ofthe(encrypted) file that 
Ilcontains the ticket 
Ilpostcondition: the filename of the (encrypted) file that contains the 
II tableclass object is returned 
I I ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
char* prepare_table(const char*); 
I I ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iia packet arrives and needs to be authenticated 
Ilpostcondition: if the mac of the packet is the same with the mac that nac 
169 
II calculates for the packet the packet is authenticated and 
II "true" is returned. Otherwise "false" 
I I ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool authenticate yacket(ip yacketclass ip yacket); 
private: 
Iidata 
lithe database vector of hosts and tables 
host_table_vector hosts_tables_db; 
Ilauxilliary functions 
Ilfor the authentication 
IINOT NEEDED TAKE OUT AT CLEANUP 
char* ge.nerate_macO; 
bool compare _ macs( char* in_mac ,char* calculated_mac); 
Iladd to database of hosts and tables 
void add_host_table (int host, tableclass* tableptr); 
};llend nac class 
#endif 




II File: nacclass.cpp 
II Name: Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
a Operating Enviroment: MS Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver 5.0 
II Date: 19 September 1998 
II Description: the same as in nacclass.h file 
II 











I I --------------------------------------------------------------------_________ _ 
lifunction: default constructor 
Ilreturn value: a nacclass object 
Ilparameters: none 
Ilpurpose: an empty database of hosts_tables is created 
I I -----------------------------------------------------------------____________ _ 
II 
nacclass: :nacclassO {} 
I 1-----------------------------------------------------------------------------_ 
lifunction: destructor 
Ilretum value: none 
Ilparameters: none 
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Ilpurpose: destroys "this" nacclass object 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
nacclass: :-nacclassO {} 
Ilmember functions 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: prepare_table(const char* HOST_TlCKET]ILE) 
Ilreturn value: char* 
Ilparameters: const char* HOST_TICKET_FILE 
Ilpurpose: a host asks for a table by sending the file name of the file that 
II contains the host_ticket_ class object 
II the nacclass object (nac) reads the hosUd and the ticketfile name 
II from the HOST_TlCKET]ILE file. NAC decrypts the ticketfile and gets 
II the hosUd and the session_key(as they were encrypted by kerberos). 
II If the hosUd send by the host is the same with the hosUd that was 
II retrieved from the ticket: NAC prepares a new tableclass object, adds 
II an entry for the host to the hosts_tables database, puts the table to 
II a file, encrypts it with the session_key (retrieved from the ticket) 
II and returns the filename of the encrypted file to the host. Otherwise 
II if the host is not verified by the ticket the string "invalid_ticket" 
II is returned. 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
char* nacclass::prepare_table(const char* HOST_TlCKET]ILE) 
char* retname = "invalid_ticket"; 
IIFIRST need to read from the file the hosUd and 
lithe ticket_file name 
host_ticket_ class host_ticket; 
ticketclass host_key; 
Ilopen the file for input 
fstream in(HOST_TICKET]ILE, ios::in); 
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Ilget the host_ticket_class object 
in» host_ticket; 
Ilget the data from the host_ticket_class object 
int hosUd = host_ticket.hosUd_is(); 
char* ticket_file = host_ ticketticket_ file _ is(); 
fino need this stream anymore 
in.close(); 
Iidecrypt the ticket file using the nackey 
//decrypt (ticket_file,"nackey"); 
Ilfrom the decrypted file 
Ilopen it for input 
fstream t_in(ticket_file, ios::in); 
Ilread the host id and the sessionkey in the host_key_class object 
Un» host_key; 
Ilfrom the host_key_class object 
Ilget the data needed to verify the host 
int ticket_hosUd = host_key.hosUd_isO; 
Iluse it if encryption is integrated 
Ilchar* session_key = host_key.session_key_isO; 
Iionly if host is verified by the ticket 
if (hosUd = ticket_ hosUd) { 
Iidynamically allocate space for a table class object 
tableclass* new_table -IJtr= new tableclassO; 
Ilinitialize the key table 
new_table -IJtr -> initialize_the _key -IJool(hosUd); 
Ilupdate the database with the new entry 
add _ host_ table(hosUd,new _table -IJtr); 
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Ilprepare the table file to be sent to the host 
fstream out(TABLE]ILE, ios::out); 
out«(*new _table -ptr); 
out.cIoseO; 
Ilencrypt the file using the "session key" 
Ilencrypt(T ABLE ]ILE, session_key); 
11th is file name prepare to return 





lifunction: authenticate -packet(ip -packetcIass ip -packet) 
Ilreturn value: bool 
Ilparameters: ip -packetcIass ip -packet 
Ilpurpose: nac extracts the filename that contains the (actual)message 
II The contents of this file are copied to the a stream buffer 
II The ki and the hosUd are retrieved from the ip-packetcIass object 
II using the ip-packetcIass functionality. Nac checks to see if the host 
II that created the ip -packet is authorized to send packets (if an entry 
II exists for this host in the hosts_tables_db). If this is "true" (a 
II table exists for the host) the key for the relevant ki is retrieved 
II and the ki and the key is APPENDED to the stream buffer file. 
II MD5 is called for the FILE_TO_HASH and the 128 bit (16 byte) mac is 
II calculated. If the calculated mac is the same with the ip-packet mac 
II the ip-packet is authenticated to go and the function returns "true" 




bool naccIass::authenticate -packet(ip -packetclass ip -packet) 
174 
{ 
bool authenticated = false; 
lithe message data is in this file 
char* message_file = ip-packet.filename_isO; 
Iia pointer to a buffer that will carry the contents of the message 
char* temp_buffer = new char[MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE] ; 
char* message_buffer; 
int ki = ip -packet.kUsO; 
int hosUd= ip -packet.hosUsO; 
intkey = 0; 
if(hosts _tables _ db.is _ host_ authorized(hosUd» { 
key = 110sts_tables_db. 
key Jor yost_ ki(hosUd,ki); 
}llend if 
lithe key has to be appended in the next line to the message 
temp_buffer = copytobuffer(message _file,temp _ buffer,ki,key); 
message_buffer = new char [strlen(temp_buffer)+ 1]; 
strcpy (message_buffer, temp_buffer); 
delete[] temp_buffer; 
IlmdS HAS TO BE CALLED FOR THE WHOLE THING 
unsigned char* mac = MDSString(message_buffer); 
if (compare2Digest(mac,ip -packet.mac _isO» { 
authenticated = true; 
return authenticated; 
} I lend authenticate -packet(ip -packetclass ip -packet) 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: add_host_table (int host, tableclass * tableptr) 
Ilretum value: none 
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Ilparameters: int host, tableclass * tableptr 
Ilpurpose: it adds an entry to the hosts_tables_db database ofnac. 
II First a host_table_class object is created then the function uses 
II the functionality of the host_table_vector to add the new entry to 
II the hosts_tables_db. 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
void nacclass::add_host_table (int host, tableclass * tableptr) 
host_table_class new _ host_ table(host,tableptr); 
hosts_tables _ db.add _ host_table(new _host_table); 
return ; 
}II 
Ilend file nacclass.cpp 
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II File: tableclass.h 
II Name: Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: MS Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver 5.0 
II Date: 19 September 1998 
II Description:The table of (key_index,key) pairs created by nac and sent 
II to the host. The STL::map data structure was chosen to contain 
II the pairs ofki and key. The map"key" (first of the pair) is 
II the ki and the value (second of the pair) is the key. We chose 
II the key to be an integer value created by the srand function of 
II C++ with seed the hosUd (for uniqueness of the random values). 
II This is a "naive" approach and was chosen for simplicity for demo 
II purposes. In a more serious implementation a key ~enerator must 
II be used and the key maybe chosen to be other than an integer 
II (a string maybe). 
II The class contains a map ofNUM]AIRS = 10 ki-key pairs and 
II the necessary functions to get the data. The auxiIliary 
II functions are private so only the nac can get the data. 
II TO DO: CONSIDER USING RANDOM kis ALSO,DOES NOT AFFECT THE MAP, 
II NOT NECESSARY 
II 
II Assumptions: we assume only authorized users will use the« and» operator 










using namespace std; 
Iia map is used for the tag_key pairs 
typedefmap<int ,int ,Iess<int> > table_oCki_keyyairs; 
class tableclass{ 
Ilfriend 
Ilwe want nac to access private part 
friend class nacclass; 
Iland the database of the nac 
friend class host_table_vector; 
Ililo stream operators overloading 
friend ostream& operator«(ostream &, tableclass& ); 










Iia host asks for the next ktkey pair from the table 
int get_next_ki 0; 
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int get_ nextyey(int ki)const; 
Iinot really needed, I put it for Debuging 





Ilinitialize the tag key pool 
Iluse as seed the host_id for uniqueness 
void tableclass: : initialize _the_key yool(int hosUd); 
Iiservice intented for the NAC to look_up the table to fmd a key 
int look_up _table Jor _ key(int ki)const; 
};llend table class 
#endif 




II File: tableclass.cpp 
II Name: Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: MS Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland e++ for Windows, ver 5.0 
II Date: 19 September 1998 
II Description: same as in the header file 
II 
II Assumptions:we assume only authorized users will use the« and» operator 








lifunction: default constructor 
Ilreturn value: a tableclass object 
Ilparameters: none 
Ilpurpose: the initial values are entered in order to be able to check the 




Iljust create a zeroized object 
for (int i = 1; i<= NUM]AIRS; i++){ 
ki _key _table[i]=O; 
} Ilend constructor 
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I 1------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: copy constructor 
Ilretum value: a tableclass object 
Ilparameters: NEW_TABLE, a const tableclass object passed by reference; 
Ilpurpose: the creation ofa table object with the same values as 
I I the NEW_TABLE object 
IIWARNING: if you change the ki allocation from sequential to random 
II with the use of a ki_generator this WOULD NOT WORK instead 
I I you should use iterators to copy the NEW_TABLE object to the 
II newly created table 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
tableclass::tableclass (const tableclass &NEW _TABLE) 
for (int i = 1; i<= NUM]AIRS; i++){ 
ki_ key _ table[i] = NEW _ T ABLE.ki_ key _table[i]; 
}llend copy constructor 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: destructor 
Ilretum value: none 
Ilparameters: none 




11m ember functions 
I 1------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: initialize_the _key yool(int host_ id) 
Ilretum value: none 
Ilparameters: int host_id, to be used as seed 
Ilpurpose: This function is a service to the naco 
II The key values are created using the srand function in C++ and then 
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II they are entered to the map. The "key" to the map is the ki. 
Ilremarks: as we mentioned in the header file description a key generator 
II should be chosen for a more elaborate approach. Also here the kis 
II are sequential from 1 to NUM]AIR.It may look more elegant to 
II use a ki_generator for that purpose also. These more elaborate 
II solutions would not affect the functionality of our object. We chose 
II the simple approach for this demo. 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
void tableclass::initialize _the_key yool(int hostjd) 
Ilinitializing the map 
Iluse the host to seed rand for recognition purposes 
srand(st~tic _ cast<unsigned int>(hostjd)); 
for(int i = 1; i<=NUM]AIRS; i++){ 
ki_key_table[i]= randO; 
return; 
}llend initialize_the_keyyool(int hostjd) 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: get_next_ki 
Ilretum value: int,the next ki 
Ilparameters: none 
Ilpurpose: service provided to a host, 
II the host asks for the next ki from the table, the next ki in the map 




int tableclass::get_next_ki 0 
{ 
Ilpick the next ki for the next series of packets 
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static int current_ ki = 0; 
current_ki++;llstart from 1 
lIthe mod forces current_ ki to be in the range or O-(NUM _PAIRS-I) 
Ilso +1 corrects it to 1 - NUM_PAIRS 
if (current_ ki%(NUM] AIRS+ 1) = O){llthe whole range was covered 
Ilreset the counter 
current_ ki= 1; 
} 
return current_ ki; 
}llend get_next_kiO 
I 1------------------------------------------------------------------------------
llfunction: get_next_key(int ki) 
Ilretum value: int,the next key 
Ilparameters: none 
Ilpurpose: service provided to a host, 
II the host asks for the next key from the table for a given ki 
II the logic simply follows from the above 
I 1------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 





llfunction: look_up _table jor _ key(int ki) 
Ilretum value: int, the key corresponding to this ki 
Ilparameters: int ki 
Ilpurpose: services provided to the NAC 
II friend class nacclass to the table object requests to fmd 




int tableclass::look_up_table_for_key(int ki)const 
return ki_key_table[ki]; 
}llend 100k_up_tableJor_key(int ki) 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: print_ tab leO 
Ilreturn value: none 
Ilparameters: none 




if (kt key _table.sizeO> O){ 
cout« tIki key" «endl; 
for (table _ of_ ki_key.Yairs::iterator i = ki_ key _table.beginO; 
i != ki_key_table.endO;i++){ 
} 
cout« (*i).first«" "« (*i).second«endl; 
}llend for 




lifunction: ostream& operator«(ostream & out, tableclass& MY_TABLE) 
Ilreturn value:ostream& 
Ilparameters: ostream out,tableclass MY_TABLE 
Ilpurpose: a user defined class has to define how «behaves. 
II In our case if the table size passed in by ref has 0 size 
II then we only inform the user that the 
II table does not exist, otherwise we display the two values 
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II of each pair in the map using an iterator. 
Ilwarning: DOES NOT HAVE to change when the kis are not in the range 
II l-NUMYAIRS but are selected randomly 
II ALSO no need to change anything if we change the key type,as 
II long as «works for that type (native; we must take care of it 
II if we use a user defmed type) 
Ilremark: MY_TABLE here is not const as it should because the compiler does not 
II allow the iterators to be declared 
11---------------------------------------------------------------------________ _ 
II 
ostream& operator«(ostream & out, tableclass& MY_TABLE) 
{ 
if (MY_TABLE.ki_key_table.sizeO <= O){ 
Ilfor some reason the table is not there 
out«"<table does not exist> "« endl; 
else { 
for(table_oCki_key yairs::iterator i = 
MY _ TABLE.ki_ key _ table.beginO; 
i!= MY_TABLE.ki_key_table.endO;i++){ 






}llend «0 overloading 
11----------------------------------------------------------------------------__ 
lifunction: istream& operator»(istream & in, tableclass& my_table) 
Ilretum value:istream& 
Ilparameters: istream in,tableclass my_table 
Ilpurpose: a user defmed class has to defme how» behaves. 
II Here we input the table pairs to the tableclass object on the RHS 
Ilwarning: DOES NOT HAVE to change when the kis are not in the range 
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II l-NUM]AIRS but are selected randomly 
II ALSO no need to change anything if we change the key type,as 
II long as» works for that type (native); we must take care of it 
II if we use a user defined type 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
istream& operator»(istream & in, tableclass& my_table) 
for (table_oCki_key,Yairs::iterator i = 
my _table.ki_ key _table.begin(); 
i != my_table.ki_key_table.end();i++){ 
in» (*i).frrst; 
in» (*i).second ; 
retum(in); 
}llend »() overloading 
Ilend file tablecIass.cpp 
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#ifndef _ticketclass_H_ 
#defme _ ticketclass _ H_ 
fi***************************************************** ************************* 
fi***************************************************** ************************* 
II File: ticketclass.h 
II Name: Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: MS Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver 5.0 
II Date: 19 September 1998 
II Description:This is the ticket created by kerberos and send by the host 
II to the naco The class contains the host_id and the session_key 
I I ~s well as the necessary functions to get the data. The auxilliary 
II functions are private so only the nac can get the data. No other 
II class can access the ticket data. 
II 







class ticketclass { 
Ilfriend 
Ilwe want nac to access private part 
friend class nacclass; 
Ililo stream operator overloading 
friend ostream& operator«(ostream &,const ticketclass&); 





Ilfor a session with the nac the host must use the ticket 
II and the session key created by the kerberos 
Ilanother constructor 
explicit ticketclass (int hosUd , char* session_key); 
Ilcopy const 








Ilmade private to be used by friend nac class 
lito get the info needed 
int hosUd _isOconst; 
char* session_key _isOconst; 
};llend ticketclass 
#endif 




II File: ticketclass.cpp 
II Name : Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: MS Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver 5.0 
I I Date: 19 September 1998 
II Description: same as in the header file 
II 
II Assumptions: we assume only authorized users will use the «and» operator 







lifunction: default constructor 
Ilretum value: a ticket class object 
Ilparameters: none 
Ilpurpose: the initial values are entered in order to be able to check the 
Ilexistance of a key 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
ticketclass: :ticketclassO:hosUd( -1 ),session _ key("no _key") {} 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: another constructor 
Ilretum value: a ticket class object 
Ilparameters: host_id, session_key 
Ilpurpose:a ticket object for host:hosUd 
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II the session_key value has been created by a kerberos object 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
ticketclass::ticketclass (int hosUd,char* session_key): 
host_ id(hosUd),session _ key( session_key) {} 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: copy constructor 
Ilretum value: a ticket class object 
Ilparameters: new_ticket, a ticket class object passed by reference; 
Ilpurpose: the creation of a ticket object with the same values as 
II the new_ticket object 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
ticketclass: :ticketclass( const ticketclass & new_ticket) 
hosUd = new _ticket.hosUd; 
session_key = new _ ticket.session _key; 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: destructor 
Ilretum value: none 
Ilparameters: none 
Ilpurpose: destroys "this" ticket class object 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 




Ilretum value: the hosUd(int) of this object 
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Ilparameters: none 
Ilpurpose: friend class (nac class) to the ticket object can read for which 
II host this ticket is. The function can read the value but cannot 
II change it (const) 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
int ticketclass: :hosUd _isOconst 
return hosUd; 
}llend host id is 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: session_key_is 
Ilreturn va)ue: the session_key (int) of this object 
Ilparameters: none 
Ilpurpose: friend class (nac class) to the ticket object can read the 
II session_key included in this ticket.The function can read the 
II value but cannot change it (const) 
I 1------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
char* ticketclass: :session _key _isOconst 
{ 
return session_key; 
}llend session_key _is 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: ostream& operator«( ostream & out, const ticketclass& MY_TICKET) 
Ilreturn value:ostream& 
Ilparameters: ostream & out,ticketclass& MY_TICKET 
Ilpurpose: a user defmed class has to defme how« behaves. 
II In our case if the host_id=-l then we only infonn the user that the 
II ticket does not exist (because it is not properly initialized) 




ostream& operator«(ostream & out, const ticketclass& MY_TICKET) 
if (MY _ TICKET.hosUd <O){ 
fino ticket has been assigned 
out«"<ticket does not exist> "« endl; 
else { 
out« MY_TICKET.hosUd «endl; 
out «MY _ TICKET. session _ key«endl; 
retum( out); 
}llend «0 overloading 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lifunction: istream& operator»(istream & in, ticketcIass& my_ticket) 
Ilretum value:istream& 
Ilparameters: istream & in,ticketclass& my_ticket 
Ilpurpose: a user defined class has to defme how» behaves. 
II Here we input the ticket values to ticketclass object on the RHS 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 
istream& operator»(istream & in, ticketclass& my_ticket) 
in» my_ticket.hosUd ; 
in » my _ticket.session _key; 
retum(in); 
}llend »() overloading 
Ilend file ticketclass.cpp 
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APPENDIX D. DOCUMENTATION FOR MD5 PERFORMANCE TEST CODE 
1. Description 
The program measures the throughput of the MD5 message digest algorithm. The 
program uses the services of the "buffercreate.h" file. MainO creates a series of eight 
messages with sizes 512 bytes, 1,2,4,8, 16,32 and 64 Kbytes and applies MD5 on 
them. To calculate an average value for the throughput we calculate the MD5 of each of 
these messages 1000 times. 
2. Layers 
The main uses three function to measure the throughput: 
Create _buffer: receives the ostrstream object (by reference) and a float that 
is the size of the message that we want to be created and it floods the 
object with the char "a" up to the size that was passed in as the second 
argument. 
Calculate _time: receives an string (char*) and calculates how long it takes (in 
msecs) to apply MD5 on it 1000 times. It returns the calculated time. 
calculate Jhroughput: the time that took to apply MD5 1000 times on a string and 




3.1.1 DESCRIPTION: The mainO declares eight char*s and eight ostrstream output 
objects. The objects are declared without arguments therefore they dynamically allocate 
as many memory is required for the data that are going to be output to them. They stop 
allocating memory only when we "freeze" them using the .strO member function. Then 
the messages (buffers) are filled by calling the create _ buffer( ) function and are frozen. 
For each of them we calculate the time that it takes for executing 1000 the MD5StringO 
function and the throughput. 






Return value: clock t 
Description: a string, is passed in and MD5 is applied 1000 on it. The time 
for all the itterations is calculated and returned. We try to calculate pure 
MD5 throughput thats why after we finish with MD5 we calculate the time 
that was spend as loop overhead and we subtract it (We itterate the loop 
1000 times without doing anything) 
Calculate_throughput 
Input: clock_t, float 
Output: none 
Return value: float 
Description: performs only the calculation of the throughput solving the 
equation. 
3.2 buffercreate 
3.2.1 DESCRIPTION: The file contains only one function that creates strings (buffers) 
of the requested size. 
3.2.2. DATA: none 
3.2.3. FUNCTIONS: 
Create buffer 
Input: ostrstream &, float 
Output: none 
Return value: clock t 
Description: an ostrstream object is passed in by reference, and a float. 
The float is the size in Kbytes of the string that we want the object to 
contain at the end of the function execution. We output character "a" so 
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many times as the size parameter dictates in the ostrstream object. Then 
we convert it to a string and we return a reference to this string. 
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APPENDIX E. MD5 PERFORMANCE TEST CODE 
#ifndef _ buffercreate _ H_ 
#defme _ buffercreate _ H_ 
~****************************************************************************** 
~****************************************************************************** 
II File: buffercreate.cpp 
II Author: Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland c++ for Windows, ver. 5.02 
II Date: 17 Sep 1998 
I I Description: This is an auxilliary file that provides the neccesary function 
II that allows the creation of messages in streambuffers for the 
II testing program ofMD5. the size of the message that we need to 
II created is passed as a parameter and a reference to a string 
II stream object. Postcondition the strstream object contains a 












ostrstream& create_buffer (ostrstream &sout, float size); 





II File: buffercreate.cpp 
II Author: Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver. 5.02 
II Date: 17 Sep 1998 
II Description: This is an auxilliary file that provides the neccesary function 
II that allows the creation of messages in streambuffers for the 










ostrstream& create_buffer (ostrstream &sout, float size) 
{ 
} 
int buffersize = static _ cast<int>(size * 1024); 
unsigned char fill = 'a'; 
for (int i=O ;i< buffersize;i++) 





II File: throughputtest.cpp 
I I Author : Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver. 5.02 
II Date: 17 Sep 1998 
II Description: This is the measuring code for the MD5 throughput.The driver 
II creates a series of (eight) messages (in buffers) and calculates 
II the throughput of MD5 for every one of them. 














clock_t calculate_time (char* inbuffer); 







char* buffer512 ; 
char* bufferl K ; 
char* buffer2K ; 
char* buffer4K ; 
char* buffer8K ; 
char* buffer16K ; 
char* buffer32K ; 
char* buffer64K ; 
Ilcreate objects that will get the created buffers and will "freeze" them 
ostrstream s050ut; 




ostrstream s 160ut; 
ostrstream s320ut; 
ostrstream s640ut; 
cout« "\n The program is creating the messages," 
«"512 bytes up to 64 Kbytes."; 
llfiH the buffers up to the requested size and then "freeze" them (to avoid 
Ilany accidental modification of their size. Assign their contents to strings 
buffer512 = create_buffer (s050ut,O.5).strO; 
cout«"."; 
bufferlK = create_buffer (slout,l).strO; 
cout«"."; 
buffer2K = create_buffer (s20ut,2).strO; 
cout«"."; 
buffer4K = create_buffer (s40ut,4).strO; 
cout«"."; 
buffer8K = create_buffer (s80ut,8).strO; 
cout«"."; 
buffer16K = create_buffer (s160ut,16).strO; 
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cout«"."; 
buffer32K = create_buffer (s32out,32).strO; 
cout«"."; 
buffer64K = create_buffer (s64out,64).strO; 
cout«". "«endl; 
tempthroughput = calculate_throughput (calculate _time(buffer512),0.5); 
printf("\n CALCULATED THROUGHPUT FOR BUFFER 512 = %f[Mbits/sec]\n", 
(double )(tempthroughput»; 
avgthroughput += tempthroughput; 
tempthroughput = calculate_throughput (calculate _ time(buffer 1 K), 1 ); 
printf ("\n CALCULATED THROUGHPUT FOR BUFFER I K = %f [Mbits/sec] \n", 
(double )(tempthroughput»; 
avgthroughput += tempthroughput; 
tempthroughput = calculate_throughput (calculate _ time(buffer2K),2); 
printf ("\n CALCULATED THROUGHPUT FOR BUFFER 2K = %f [Mbits/sec] \n", 
(double )(tempthroughput»; 
avgthroughput += tempthroughput; 
tempthroughput = calculate_throughput (calculate _time(buffer4K),4); 
printf ("\n CALCULATED THROUGHPUT FOR BUFFER 4K = %f [Mbits/sec] \n", 
( double )( tempthroughput»; 
avgthroughput += tempthroughput; 
tempthroughput = calculate_throughput ( calculate_time (buffer8K),8); 
printf ("\n CALCULATED THROUGHPUT FOR BUFFER 8K = %f [Mbits/sec] \n", 
(double)(tempthroughput»; 
avgthroughput += tempthroughput; 
tempthroughput = calculate_throughput (calculate _time(buffer 16K), 16); 
printf ("\n CALCULATED THROUGHPUT FOR BUFFER 16K = %f [Mbits/sec] \n", 
(double)(tempthroughput»; 
avgthroughput += tempthroughput; 
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tempthroughput = calculate_throughput (calculate _time(buffer32K),32); 
printf("\n CALCULATED THROUGHPUT FOR BUFFER 32K = %f[Mbitslsec] \n", 
(double )(tempthroughput)); 
avgthroughput += tempthroughput; 
tempthroughput = calculate_throughput (calculate _ time(buffer64 K),64); 
printf("\n CALCULATED THROUGHPUT FOR BUFFER 64K = %f[Mbits/sec] \n", 
(double)(tempthroughput)); 
avgthroughput += tempthroughput; 
Ilcalculate the average throughput, divide by the number of messages 
avgthroughput = avgthroughput/8; 
printf ("\n CALCULATED AVERAGE THROUGHPUT = %f[Mbits/sec] \n", 
avgthroughput); 






Ilinput: char* inbuffer 
Iioutput: clock_t 
IlRemarks: we calculate the MD5 performance on the string that we received 
II as a parameter. We calculate it 1000 times for accuracy purposes. 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
clock_t calculate_time (char* inbuffer) 
clock_t startI_clock; 
clock _ t stop I_clock; 
clock_t start2_clock; 
clock _ t stop2 _clock; 
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Ilcalculate time for 1000 iterations 
startl_ clock = clockO; 
for(int i = 0; i < 1000; i++) 
MD5TestString (inbuffer); 
stop I_clock = clockO; 
Ilcalculate the overhead that is irrelevant with MD5 
start2 _clock = clockO; 
for(int i = 0 ; i < 1000; i++) 
stop2 _clock = clockO; 
Iland suptract it to fmd the MD performance 
return_time = (stop 1_ clock-start 1_ clock)-(stop2 _ clock-start2 _clock) ; 
I I ----------------------------------------------------------------------------__ 
I lfunction: calculate_throughput 
Ilinput: clock_t time, float bufsize 
Iioutput: clock_t 
IlRemarks: we calculate the MD5 throughput for a given bufsize. 
II The bufsize is Kbytes so we calculate bits by 
II multiplying by 8*1024.The time that we receive is for 1000 MD5 
II applications on the message and the time is in 
II milliseconds therefore the whole result is Mbits/sec. 
I I ------------------------------------------------------------------------_____ _ 
float calculate _throughput( clock _t time, float bufsize) 
return ((8*bufsize* 1024)/(time )); 
Ilend throughputtest.cpp file 
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APPENDIX F. DOCUMENTATION FOR MAC COMPARISON 
PERFORMANCE TEST CODE 
1. Description 
The program measures the comparitive performance of the two MAC comparison 
functions. 
2. Layers 
The main uses four functions to calculate the performance: 
Calculate _time _same: defines two same strings, applies MDS on both and 
calculates how long it takes to execute a comparison of the two message digests one 
million times. It uses the byte XORing method (it is described in Appendix A). 
Calculate2_time_same: defines two same strings, applies MDS on both and 
calculates how long it takes to execute a comparison of the two message digests one 
million times. It uses the integer method (it is described in Appendix A). 
Calculate_time _different: defines two different strings, applies MDS on both and 
calculates how long it takes to execute a comparison of the two message digests one 
million times. It uses the byte XORing method (it is described in Appendix A). 
Calculate2 _time_different: defines two different strings, applies MDS on both and 
calculates how long it takes to execute a comparison of the two message digests one 
million times. It uses the integer method (it is described in Appendix A). 
4. Modules 
3.1 main 
3.1.1 DESCRIPTION: The main just makes the calls to the different functions that 
execute the comparisons and calculate the execution time and displays the resulst to the 
user explaining what it does. 
3.1.4 DATA: four type c1ock_t variables (to accommodate the results of the functions) 
3.1.S FUNCTIONS: 





Return value: clock t 
Description: the function declares and defines two same strings and 
calculates their message digests. The 16 byte digests are compared using 
the byte XORing method (byte by byte XOR ing). The comparison is 
repeated 1000000 times for averaging the result. The time is calculated 
and returned. 




Return value: clock t 
Description: the function declares and defines two same strings and 
calculates their message digests. The 16 byte digests are compared using 
the integer method (cast to four integers and subtract). The comparison is 
repeated 1000000 times for averaging the result. The time is calculated 
and returned. 
Calculate Jime _different 
Input: none 
Output: none 
Return value: clock t 
Description: the function declares and defines two different strings and 
calculates their message digests. The 16 byte digests are compared using 
the byte XORing method. The comparison is repeated 1000000 times for 




Return value: clock t 
206 
Description: the function declares and defines two different strings and 
calculates their message digests. The 16 byte digests are compared using 
the integer method. The comparison is repeated 1000000 times for 
avereging the result. The time is calculated and returned. 
207 
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APPENDIX G. MAC COMPARISON PERFORMANCE CODE 
~****************************************************************************** 
~****************************************************************************** 
II File: MAComparetest.cpp 
II Name: Ioannis Kondoulis 
II 
II Operating Enviroment: Windows NT 4.0 
II compiler: Borland C++ for Windows, ver. 5.02 
II Date: 17 Sep 1998 
II Description: This is a test program that measures the performance of the two 
II functions that compare 128 bit MACs.The functions themselves are 
II included in the file hashutils.c that interfaces the MD5 code. 
II It uses the clock_t for the measurement of time. Because the time 
II for the comparison is very small we execute it one million times 
II in order to measure it. The result we get is in [msec]. 
II Assumptions:none 
II 











clock_t calculate_time_same 0; 
clock_t calculate2_time_same 0; 
clock _ t calculate_time _ differentO; 
clock _ t calculate2 _time _ differentO; 
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int mainO 
cout« "In the following measurements the two strings are the SAME," 
«endl«"therefore,their message digests are the same.\n"«endl; 
cout«"Using the byte XORing method for MAC comparison.\n" 
«"We execute 10 itterations,results in [nanosecs]'\n"«endl; 
clock _ t tempclock; 
for (int i =0; i <10; i++){ 
tempclock = calculate_time _ sameO; 
cout«tempclock«' '; 
cout«e!.1dl; 
cout«"\n Using the integer method for MAC comparison.\n" 
«"We execute 10 itterations,results in [nanosecs]'\n"«endl; 
clock_t tempclock2; 
for (int i =0; i <10; i++){ 
tempclock2 = calculate2_tirne_sameO; 
cout«tempclock2«' '; 
cout< <endl< <endl; 
cout« "In the following measurements the two strings are the DIFFERENT," 
«endl«"therefore,their message digests are different.\n"«endl; 
cout«"Using the byte XORing method for MAC comparison.\n" 
«"We execute 10 itterations,results in [nanosecs].\n"«endl; 
clock_t tempclock3; 
for (int i =0; i <10; i++){ 
} 




cout«"\n Using the integer method for MAC comparison.\n" 
«" We execute 10 itterations,results in [nanosecs].\n"«endl; 
clock_t tempclock4; 
for (int i =0; i <10; i++){ 
tempclock4 = calculate2 _time _ differentO; 
cout«tempclock4«' '; 
cout< <endl< <endl; 




clock_t calculate_time_same 0 
{ 
clock t startl_ clock; 
clock_t stop I_clock; 
clock _ t start2 _clock; 
clock_t stop2_clock; 
clock _t return_time; 
unsigned char* tempchar 1 ; 
unsigned char* tempchar2; 
tempcharl = MD5String ("Mary had a little lamp"); 
tempchar2 = MD5String ("Mary had a little lamp "); 
startl_ clock = clockO; 
for(int i = 0; i < 1000000; i++){ 
compareDigest(tempchar 1 ,tempchar2); 
stop I_clock = clockO; 
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start2 _clock = clockO; 
for(int i = 0; i < 1000000; i++){ 
lido nothing 
stop2 _clock = clockO; 
return return_time; 
clock_t !!tartl_clock; 
clock_t stop I_clock; 
clock _ t start2 _clock; 
clock_t stop2_clock; 
clock_t return_time; 
unsigned char* tempcharl; 
unsigned char* tempchar2; 
tempcharl = MD5String ("Mary had a little lamp"); 
tempchar2 = MD5String ("Mary had a little lamp"); 
startl_clock = clockO; 
for(int i = 0; i < 1000000; i++){ 
compare2Digest(tempchar 1 ,tempchar2); 
} 
stop I_clock = clockO; 
start2 _clock = clockO; 
for(int i = 0; i < 1000000; i++){ 
lido nothing 
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stop2 _clock = clock(); 




clock _t start2 _clock; 
clock_t stop2_clock; 
clock_t return_time; 
unsigne~ char* tempcharl; 
unsigned char* tempchar2; 
tempcharl = MD5String ("Mary had a little lamp"); 
tempchar2 = MD5String ("Mary had a black dog"); 
startl_clock = clockO; 
for(int i = 0; i < 1000000; i++){ 
compareDigest(tempchar 1 ,tempchar2); 
} 
stop I_clock = clockO; 
start2 _clock = clockO; 
for(int i = 0; i < 1000000; i++){ 
lido nothing 
stop2 _clock = clockO; 
return return_time; 
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clock _ t calculate2 _time_different 0 
clock_t startl_clock; 
clock_t stop I_clock; 
clock _t start2 _clock; 
clock_t stop2_clock; 
clock_t return_time; 
unsigned char* tempcharl; 
unsigned char* tempchar2; 
tempcharl = MD5String ("Mary had a little lamp"); 
tempchar2 = MD5String ("Mary had a black dog"); 
startl_ctock = clockO; 
for(int i = 0; i < 1000000; i++){ 
compare2Digest(tempchar 1 ,tempchar2); 
} 
stopl_clock = clockO; 
start2_clock = clockO; 
for(int i = 0; i < 1000000; i++){ 
lido nothing 
stop2 _clock = clockO; 
return_time = (stop 1_ clock-start 1_ clock)-( stop2 _clock -start2 _clock); 
return return_time; 
Ilend MAComparetest.cpp file 
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